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ABSTRACT
In this thesis we develop an asset pricing model with heterogeneous institutional investors,
and we provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects of benchmark heterogeneity on
equilibrium prices and portfolio allocations. We find that an institution’s holdings are
higher for those assets that are exclusively part of its benchmark, are negative for those
assets that are in the other institution’s benchmarks and are zero for the risk free asset.
These results imply that correlation across benchmarks is negative. We define a measure
of asymmetry between benchmarks and show how it affects asset prices and portfolio allo-
cations. Institutions revert their holdings to their benchmarks when fundamental volatility
is high – flight to benchmark – thus creating a demand pressure on the overlapping part of
benchmarks, which in turn pushes prices up and market prices of risk down even further.
Our model also allows to study the twin stocks discrepancy, the low volatility puzzle and
the asset class effect. We conclude our analysis by characterizing an endogenous choice of
benchmark, and show that institutions optimally select the same fully diversified index.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Heterogeneity in the funds industry is substantial. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005)
show that funds differ in their industry concentration. The more concentrated funds tend
to follow distinct investment styles. Furthermore, institutional ownership is gradually in-
creasing: by the end of 2010 it reached 67% in the equity market. A salient aspect of the
funds industry is that funds’ performance is measured relative to an index. This became
quite explicit when in 1998 the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) required mutual
funds to report their benchmark indices, thus making their relative performance readily
available to all investors. Understanding how this affects institutions’ incentives and ulti-
mately asset prices is paramount and is the focus of this dissertation.
In this thesis we develop an asset pricing equilibrium model with multiple institutions
in order to study the effects of benchmark heterogeneity on equilibrium prices and asset
allocations. An institutional investor is a fund manager whose performance is measured
relative to an index, which is comprised of a given combination of assets. Heterogene-
ity arises because each institution has potentially a different benchmark. In the second
chapter we review the literature. In the third chapter we layout the model and derive
the equilibrium prices and portfolio holdings in analytical form. In the fourth chapter, we
analyze the equilibrium behavior for different index configurations. In the fifth chapter
we endogenize the choice of benchmarks and report that institutions optimally choose the
same fully diversified benchmark. In the sixth chapter we introduce a different benchmark-
ing scheme and show why our choice of benchmarking scheme is more suitable to describe
2asset pricing quantities. In the seventh, we show how our model is able to rationalize some
of the most pervasive asset pricing irregularities that have received much attention in the
empirical literature. We conclude with a new testable empirical prediction that we think
is important and is not reported in the empirical literature.
Our main results are that institutions’ holdings are higher for assets that are exclusively
in their benchmarks than for assets that are also benchmarked by other institutions.1 Their
higher holdings are financed by taking short positions in the assets that are exclusive in
the other institutions’ benchmarks. The size of the short position is determined by market
clearing conditions. In addition, our numerical illustrations show that it is not optimal
for institutions to hold cash when all market participants have benchmarking motives, as
opposed to the case where some institutions do not have benchmarking motives. Without
benchmarking motives institutions take positions on the cash account.2 Furthermore, as
the index configuration becomes less symmetric, adding an asset to a wide benchmark and
deleting it from a narrow one decreases prices and volatilities, and increases market prices
of risk. In contrast, adding an asset to a benchmark without deleting it from another re-
verse the effects. When the fundamental volatility is high, institutions revert their holdings
to their benchmarks, thereby creating a demand pressure on assets that are common to
both benchmarks, which further increases prices and decreases market prices of risk. If
cash flows are affected by idiosyncratic risk, our model can explain the twin-stock price
discrepancy, the low-volatility puzzle and the asset class effect.
In our economic setting, we consider multiple risky assets with the same payoff dis-
tribution. Unlike Basak and Pavlova (2013), we do not restrict the aggregate dividend’s
distribution to be a Geometric Brownian Motion. Instead we allow it to naturally arise
1Our results pertain to cases where the information about the future dividends is the same across the
different assets, and the risk aversion parameter is bigger than one and the same for the different institutions.
2Cash, is a risk free asset with return equalized to zero. A general case, with positive risk free rate can
easily be incorporated. Though, the qualitative arguments in the thesis do not change when the risk free
return is positive.
3as a sum of individual payoffs. Furthermore, we introduce two distinct features that are
missing from Basak and Pavlova (2013). First and foremost, the economy is populated by
multiple institutions that can invest in a cash account and in the risky assets, as opposed to
a single institution. Second, their preferences are characterized by a CRRA utility function
defined over their terminal wealth relative to a benchmark, as opposed to a log utility in
terminal wealth and affine in the benchmark. We refer to an institutional investor with no
benchmark as a retail investor. In reduced form, this utility structure captures the salient
feature of relative performance concerns and the incentives of institutional investors to out-
perform their benchmarks. Institutions’ optimal terminal wealth and portfolio allocations
are determined in equilibrium such that dividends are consumed and asset markets clear.
These assets are claims to dividends, and their prices, volatilities and market prices of risk
are determined endogenously. In Chapter 3 we present the equilibrium asset prices and
portfolio allocations for a general specification of indices and in Chapter 4 we investigate a
special case of geometric averages of the risky assets with equal weights. This specification
is commonly used in practice (i.e., S&P500 Commodity Index (SPCI)) and it preserves
tractability without sacrificing the economic intuition.
The equilibrium is characterized by an optimal risk sharing rule, which determines how
much of the aggregate dividend each institution consumes. We show that the optimal
shares are given by weighted averages of the institutions’ benchmarks. In states of the
world where one benchmark is higher than the others, the related institution’s share of
the aggregate wealth will be higher. The weight of each institution is determined by its
initial weight divided by its index weight. The initial weight reflects the initial share of
institutions and the index weight reflects the co-movement of the index with the pricing
kernel. When the co-movement is high the index weight decreases, and it reduces the share
of the corresponding institution.
Importantly, equilibrium asset prices and portfolios depend on two hedging demands,
4aggregate hedging and index hedging. With the first, institutions hedge against future fluc-
tuations in the aggregate dividend volatility. With the second, instead, they hedge against
future fluctuations in each institution’s index holdings. The two hedging demands have
opposite effects on asset prices and on portfolio allocations. Risk aversion greater than
one is paramount, because risk aversion equal to one removes the index hedging and the
heterogeneity in asset prices and portfolio allocations vanishes.3 Asset pricing implica-
tions strongly depend on the benchmark heterogeneity and configurations; however, we
can analytically compare two assets if a subset of institutions that benchmark one asset
also benchmark the other. In this case, the asset benchmarked by the subset of institu-
tions has a lower price and a higher market price of risk. Intuitively, when a larger set of
institutions follows an asset, the demand pressure on that asset causes an increase in price
and a decrease in the market price of risk, so that it becomes a less desirable investment
for institutions with no benchmarking motives.
To study the role of benchmark heterogeneity, we focus our analysis on the case of two
institutions and ten assets. This setting allows us to characterize, without loss of generality,
the equilibrium implications for: (i) assets that are benchmarked by both institutions; (ii)
assets that are benchmarked by only one institution; and (iii) assets that are not bench-
marked by either of them. The number of assets of each of these types is a key determinant
of the equilibrium quantities. As shown in the previous literature, institutions’ portfolio
allocations are tilted towards their benchmarks. However, the heterogeneity of benchmarks
plays a key role in determining the magnitude of the allocation distortion and its distri-
bution within the benchmark. Four economic considerations determine the institutions’
holdings in equilibrium. First, because of diversification purposes, institutions’ shares are
equally distributed within assets of the same type. Second, an institution acts as a retail
3Risk aversion less than one is supported in equilibrium, if one exists. In such cases the existence
of equilibrium cannot be guaranteed but if it does, equilibrium sharing rules, asset prices and portfolio
allocations follow the results presented in the paper. Nonetheless, empirical analysis suggests that low risk
aversions are still greater than one, therefore, we restrict the analysis and only consider cases where risk
aversion is larger than one.
5investor with respect to those assets that are not in its benchmark but that are, instead,
in the benchmark of the other. This institution takes a short position in these assets, to
clear markets. Third, when benchmarks overlap, the institutions provide supply to one an-
other by decreasing their demands for the overlapping assets. At last, it is suboptimal for
institutions to hold cash when they both have benchmarks, as it would be more profitable
to take a short position in the assets that are benchmarked by the other institution alone.
In order to perform a sensitivity analysis, we define a measure of asymmetry in the
index configuration and show that when the index configuration is more asymmetric, the
distortion in asset prices and portfolio allocations is exacerbated. When an asset is deleted
from a narrow benchmark and is included in a wide benchmark, there are two opposing ef-
fects: a deletion effect that decreases prices and an addition effect that increases prices. In
such cases, the deletion from the narrow benchmark has stronger effects than the addition
to the wide benchmark. In contrast, when an asset is deleted from a wide benchmark and
is included in a narrow benchmark, the exact opposite occurs. Furthermore, wealth levels
incur an upward jump when the second benchmark is introduced, because a new demand
for benchmarked assets is introduced and prices immediately increase.
In the analysis of how asset prices and portfolio allocations change when the funda-
mental volatility increases, we find a flight to benchmark behavior. Institutions become
more concentrated in their benchmarks in episodes of high fundamental volatility. The
distortion is exacerbated the narrower the index, because institutions’ holdings outside
their benchmarks are higher, implying that there are more funds to reallocate. When the
benchmarks overlap, this creates a further demand pressure on the overlapping part of the
benchmark which subsequently pushes their prices up and market prices of risk down even
further.
There are several known empirical phenomena that our model may explain. The first
6implication is coined idiosyncratic risk pricing, because some of the idiosyncratic shocks
affect prices more strongly than others. All shocks appear in the aggregate hedging com-
ponent but only a few appear in the index hedging component. As it turns out, shocks
that are propagated through the index hedging component have a profound effect on asset
prices. Indeed, when dividends are significantly correlated the price difference between
benchmarked and non benchmarked assets is substantial. It is the idiosyncratic part of
the dividend stream that drives the difference. The economic intuition for this effect arises
from the fact that institutions fail to diversify in the usual sense, i.e., their portfolios are
tilted towards their benchmarks, therefore they are more exposed to shocks in these assets.
This result is aligned with the empirical evidence. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu
(2001) and Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) and Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010), claim
that due to investors’ failure to diversify, idiosyncratic risk matters for pricing.
Idiosyncratic pricing has the potential to address the twin stock price discrepancy, doc-
umented by Rosenthal and Young (1990) and Dabora and Froot (1999), and the parent and
subsidiary stock price discrepancy, documented by Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002)
and Lamont and Thaler (2003). Previous literature assumes that idiosyncratic risks do not
affect cash flows. In such cases, the twin stock price discrepancy pertains to cases where
two different companies share a constant fraction of the same cash flows but trade at very
different prices. And, parent and subsidiary stock price discrepancy pertains to cases where
the market value of the subsidiary is higher than the market value of the parent company.
In these settings additional friction must be introduced so that prices of assets with the
same cash flows trade at different prices.
In contrast, when idiosyncratic risk does affect cash flows, the two different companies
share the same ‘cash flows risk’, but are also exposed to an additional idiosyncratic risk.
Due to the additional risk exposure, aggregation of cash flows of Siamese companies and
parent and subsidiary companies is no longer possible. Therefore, prices may diverge when
7the additional idiosyncratic risk is priced. In our setting, the idiosyncratic differences be-
tween twin companies and parent and subsidiary companies have major effects on stocks
prices. Barberis and Thaler (2003) describe it as “most certainly a mispricing”.4
The second implication is the low volatility puzzle, “the greatest anomaly in finance” as
coined by Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2010). They observe in the data that low volatil-
ity portfolios outperform high volatility portfolios. Put differently, low volatility portfolios’
market prices of risk are higher than high volatility portfolios’ market prices of risk. This
result was first explored by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) and Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, and Zhang (2009), where they show that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility
have extremely low returns, contradicting what a traditional asset pricing theory implies.
As was described earlier, benchmarking institutions can possibly explain this anomaly.
The third implication, explored by Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986), is the
stock inclusion effect: a stock price increases with inclusion in- and decreases with exclusion
out- of an index. In their empirical tests they control both for fundamental changes to the
underlying firm and for changes to the firm’s quality that inclusion implies. Chen, Noronha,
and Singal (2004) show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in recent years. During
1976-1989 stock inclusion increased stock prices on the day of announcement by 3.1% while
during 1989-2000 stock inclusion has increased stock prices by 5.45%. This empirical fact
aligns with the increased size of the institutional sector over these years, as was reported by
Blume and Keim (2012), but can also be attributed to the growth of passive index funds,
as Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) report. This is in agreement with our model, predicting
4From an empirical point of view, it is reasonable to assume that there is some risk that may affect
one stock but not the other. For example, different management teams, different locations, different macro
fundamentals. If this shock is priced, then prices of Siamese stocks for that matter, may differ, even though,
future dividends or the projects that deliver the cash flows are not affected by the additional risk. In an
endowment economy, such as the one illustrated in this thesis, the supply side is suppressed. Therefore, in
a reduced form approach, modeling this outcome is done by introducing an additional shock that is present
only in one of the dividend cash flow information processes, but not the other. In that sense the future
dividend process contains information both about the future cash flow and about an additional idiosyncratic
risk.
8that institutions tilt their portfolios towards the indexed stocks, effectively increasing their
prices. Furthermore, the magnitude of the change depends on the size of the institutional
sector, as the empirical findings suggest.
The last implication, explored by Vijh (1994) and Barberis, Shliefer, and Wurgler
(2005), is the comovement of assets within the same class. In the traditional asset pricing
theory, because the comovement of prices reflects the comovement of fundamental values,
index inclusion shouldn’t affect the assets’ comovement. The evidence however, suggests
otherwise: stock inclusion leads to a shift in the correlation structure of returns, as our
model predicts.
In Chapter 5 we derive the optimal choices of benchmarks. The previous discussion
about optimal benchmark was in a contractual context. In a principal-agent framework,
the investor offers a compensation contract to the manager that optimally induces the
manager to closely follow the benchmark. However, most of the models in the literature
consider a partial equilibrium setting, where prices and benchmarks are exogenously deter-
mined. In contrast, we derive the optimal benchmarks when prices and index choices are
endogenously and jointly determined. We abstract from the principal-agent problem and
assume that each reported benchmark arises from an optimal contract, given prices and
benchmarks. When all the different institutions report their benchmarks and prices are
revealed, we can identify if the benchmarks are optimal for the given prices. In the case
where institutions are obliged to report benchmarks, the optimal index configuration arises
when all institutions are fully diversified and follow the exact same benchmark, i.e., herd.
This result implies that there is a substantial additional cost for the investor to offer the
manager an optimal benchmark contract that is not the fully diversified index. This result
is aligned with the empirical evidence: fund managers require higher fees for investing in a
specific industry or style, for example, requiring higher fees for benchmarking the Russell
1000 Growth index as opposed to the S&P500 index.
9In Chapter 6 we derive the theoretical result for a different benchmark scheme. Instead
of having relative benchmarks, here institutions have level benchmarks; they subtract the
index level from their wealth level in a CRRA utility. This choice of benchmark was
previously introduced by Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) in a dynamic setting, and beforehand
by Brennan (1993), in the first equilibrium asset pricing model with benchmarking in-
stitutions. In this chapter, we show that even though modeling institutions using level
benchmarks makes complete sense in a contractual setting, when the scope of the study
is the friction between fund managers and fund investors, it is not appropriate to model
institutions’ benchmarks this way, when the scope of the study is asset pricing. As it turns
out, the pricing kernel does not depend on the initial share, which implies that the size
of the institutional sector does not affect asset pricing. This result is counterfactual, as
there is substantial evidence supporting the argument that the size of the institutional
sector does affect the stock inclusion effect, as reported by Chen et al. (2004), and that the
comovement of assets within the same class also depends on the size of the institutional
sector, as reported by Barberis et al. (2005). Asset pricing equilibrium model therefore,
should incorporate this feature, to reflect established stylized facts.
In Chapter 7 we show that institutions benchmarking concerns is a feasible explanation
to three known empirical phenomena: Idiosyncratic pricing, the low volatility puzzle and
the asset class effect. Previously, these empirical phenomena, were explained by behavioral
asset pricing models, relying on irrational investment behavior. As far as we know, this
model is the first rational explanation addressing all these phenomena at once.
In the first phenomenon, some idiosyncratic shocks are much more pronounced in prices
than others. In our model, all shocks appear in the aggregate hedging component but only
a few appear in the index hedging component. It appears that shocks that are propagated
through the index hedging component have a profound effect on asset prices. The economic
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intuition for this effect arises from the fact that institutions fail to diversify in the usual
sense. Their portfolios are tilted towards assets in their benchmarks, which further exposes
them to shocks in these assets, as shown in Campbell et al. (2001).
In the second phenomenon, low volatility investments outperform high volatility invest-
ments. The result was reported by Baker et al. (2010) and it refutes the classical asset
pricing models, suggesting that bearing more risk should be compensated by a higher ex-
pected return. In equilibrium, institutions’ holdings are concentrated in the benchmark,
implying that the sensitivity of benchmarked assets to cash flow shocks within the in-
dex is higher than to cash flow shocks outside the index, suggesting that the volatility of
benchmarked assets is higher. Furthermore, in order to make the benchmarked assets less
desirable to hold by the other institutions, their market prices of risk are reduced, while
their volatilities remain high.
In the last phenomenon, the comovement of prices is not reflected by the comovement of
fundamental values with the aggregate dividend alone. Empirically, stock inclusion shifts
the correlation structure of returns, Vijh (1994). This result also refutes traditional asset
pricing theories suggesting that comovement of prices is only due to the correlation between
the aggregate dividend and the fundamental values. In our model, the correlation between
two assets within the same benchmark is also affected by the index hedging demand that
is present when both assets are within the same benchmark.
Chapter 8 shows a key empirical prediction that arises from this model. It is widely
known that systemic risk is a main driver of assets co-movements.5 When systemic risk
rises, correlation between assets becomes more pronounced, as was observed during the
financial crisis in 2008. However, no one really investigated how industries correlation
behaves when systemic risk, or aggregate shocks are excluded. Our theoretical prediction
5Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) provide an extensive survey on systemic risk.
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suggests that institutions revert holdings to their benchmarked assets when the market
volatility is increasing. Subsequently, due to market clearing conditions, this result implies
that correlation across benchmarks becomes negative. In this empirical analysis, we show
that when aggregate shocks are excluded, the model prediction is in fact correct. We split
the horizon into two main regimes. The high market volatility regime, between 1995-2005,
and the low market volatility regime, between 1960-1980. We calculate a one year rolling
window of time-series correlations in each regime and the correlations over each period. We
find that in the high market volatility regime, the correlation between different industries
is negative, while in the low market volatility regime, the effect is substantially mitigated
or reversed. This empirical outcome strongly supports the existence of benchmarking
institutions and reinforces the theoretical framework.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Institutional benchmarking is a strand of literature that is part of the more general del-
egated portfolio management framework. As part of managers compensation schemes,
benchmarks become increasingly important over the years, and modeling them is the main
objective of this literature. We start this chapter by overviewing the origins of asset pric-
ing models with benchmarks in static and dynamic settings. Along the way, we make the
distinction between models that build upon the friction between managers and investors
in a simple economic framework and models that abstract away from the agency friction
and build upon a rich economic framework. Despite the two different modeling approaches
the main purpose is the same and is based on the premise that institutional benchmarking
is a key driver of asset prices.
Brennan (1993) was the first to introduce financial institutions to an asset pricing equi-
librium model. He proposed a static model with two types of agents, retail investors, who
are mean-variance return optimizers, and institutions, who are mean-variance return opti-
mizers relative to the benchmark index. Both types have constant absolute risk aversion
preferences. In this model, equilibrium prices are higher and the expected return is char-
acterized by two factors: the market portfolio and the benchmark portfolio.
At that point, the literature on benchmarking was divided into two main branches.
The first branch emphasizes the agency friction between the fund managers and the fund
investors as the main source of asset pricing anomalies. Allen (2001), in his presiden-
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tial address, expresses the importance of implementing agency frictions into asset pricing
equilibrium models with institutions. Cornell and Roll (2005) explore the asset pricing
implications in a static setting and Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) in a dynamic continuous time
setting. The second branch, abstracts away from the agency friction problem. Gomez
and Zapatero (2003) and Brennan and Li (2008), among others, explore the asset pricing
implications in a static setting, while Basak and Pavlova (2013) in a dynamic continuous
time setting. The main tradeoff between the two approaches is that in the first, the inter-
action mechanism is rich but the economic structure is simple, whereas in the second it is
the other way around. Nonetheless, in both cases, due to modeling challenges most of the
benchmarking literature is in a static setting. A key shortcoming of the static models as
well as single risky asset models is that they are unable to explore changes in asset allo-
cations due to shifts in risk exposure or in model parameters. Therefore, models of these
types, apart from the inclusion effect, are unable to address the phenomena described above.
Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) were the first to explore institutions’ effects on asset prices in
a dynamic equilibrium setting. They model the fund manager explicitly and introduce an
agency friction between the fund investor and the fund manager. The fund manager cares
about the index due to a performance based fees structure in his utility function. They are
the first to introduce a constant relative risk aversion preference to a dynamic equilibrium
model with an institutional investor. Their model exhibits both the asset price inclusion
effect and the decline in market price of risk relative to the no benchmark case. However,
some of their results are in contrast with empirical findings. First, in their model asset
volatilities are lower relative to the no benchmark case. Second, in their model the size
of the institutional sector does not affect the asset pricing quantities. Empirical evidence
suggests that the effects discussed above are more pronounced in recent years, suggesting
that the size of the institutional sector does matter. See for example, Barberis et al. (2005)
for the asset class effect, Chen et al. (2004) for asset price inclusion effect.
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Basak and Pavlova (2013) also considered a dynamic setting with one institutional in-
vestor and one retail investor. In their model, the institution has a log utility in wealth
and is affine in the index, while the retail investor has log utility in wealth. In contrast to
Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), they abstract away from the agency friction but are able to in-
troduce a richer economic setting. Therefore, they are the first to show that benchmarking
institutions’ effects on asset prices can also address the asset class effect and the counter
cyclicality of market prices of risk. In addition, instead of letting the aggregate dividends
and the index to naturally arise as sums of the independent dividends, they restrict them
to be a geometric Brownian Motion. By doing this they are able to present the asset pric-
ing quantities in closed form. However, they are unable to investigate within and across
benchmark heterogeneities. In addition, the dynamics of the residual asset are not explored.
Lastly, there is a large body of work on delegated portfolio management. In this liter-
ature, models introduce an agency friction between fund managers and fund investors and
usually incorporate a very rich interaction mechanism with a very simple security mar-
ket structure. Recent papers that explore the equilibrium effects in a dynamic setting in-
clude Kapur and Timmermann (2005), Arora and Ou-Yang (2006), He and Krishnamurthy
(2012), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Vayanos and Woolley (2013), Buffa, Vayanos, and
Woolley (2014) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). In addition, our thesis also relates
to the discussion about optimal benchmarks and how the compensation contracts should
be structured. This literature includes Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985), Starks (1987),
Stoughton (1993), Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), Das and Sundaram (2002), Palomino
and Prat (2003), Larsen (2005), Liu (2005), Cadenillasa, Cvitanic, and Zapatero (2007),
Li and Tiwari (2009) and Lioui and Poncet (2013). Moreover, our thesis relates to the
literature on relative wealth concerns. For example, DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004)
and DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2008) show that competition on local resources leads
investors to care about their relative wealth in the community. As a result, investors are
over-investing and herding.
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We contribute to the literature on benchmarking institutions in two main aspects. In
the first aspect, we are the first to incorporate heterogeneity in institutional benchmarks
in an asset pricing equilibrium model. We provide a complete analysis of the heterogeneity
effects on asset prices and portfolio allocations. We find that institutions tilt their port-
folios towards the exclusive part of their benchmark and finance by taking short positions
on the other institutions’ benchmarks. In addition, adding an asset to a benchmark might
have reversed effects on the assets within the benchmark: it increases prices and volatili-
ties and decreases market prices of risk of the common component of the benchmark. In
addition, we observe that institutions revert their holdings to the benchmark in episodes
of high fundamental volatility, which creates a further demand pressure on the common
component of the benchmark that further increases prices.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 3 we introduce the main
body of this work: in section 3.1 we set up the economy, in section 3.2 we derive the
main general equilibrium result, asset prices, portfolios and key results of the model, and
in Chapter 4 we analyze the heterogeneity implications of institutions. In Chapter 5 we
derive the optimal index configuration. In Chapter 6 we derive equilibrium results, asset
prices and portfolio allocations for a level subsistence utility function. In Chapter 7 we
show that an equilibrium model with institutions can address widely known empirical asset
pricing phenomena. In Chapter 8 we show the major empirical implications arising from
the theoretical results and in Chapter 9 we summarize our key results and conclude.
Chapter 3
A Model for Institutional Benchmarking
In this Chapter we describe a general framework for which equilibrium effects of institu-
tional benchmarks on asset pricing and portfolio allocations can be explored. The frame-
work supports two different sources of heterogeneity. In the first, institutions differ in terms
of which assets are included in their benchmark and in the second, in terms of the weight
allocation for assets in the benchmark. We start the Chapter by describing the ingredients
of the economic framework, the exogenous quantities first, then, we derive the equilibrium
quantities. Later in the chapter we provide an example of the effects of geometric average
benchmarks on asset prices. We define the asymmetry measure of benchmarks and show
that it is a major driver of the discrepancy between the different assets.
3.1 The Economic Setup
In this section we develop a model to capture the heterogeneous effects of benchmarks on
asset prices and portfolios. In a complete market, endowment economy, with independent
fundamental shocks we derive the key characteristics of asset pricing with institutional
benchmarks.
Dividends: There are N independent risky dividends paid at time T . We denote the j’th
risky dividend by DjT . Over time information about DjT is revealed by the dynamics
dDjt = Djt (µdt+ σdωjt) , Dj0 > 0 (3.1)
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where µ and σ are positive constants, ωjt is a dividend specific Brownian Motion and Dj0
is the given initial level. We denote by DT the aggregate dividend, DT =
∑N
j=1DjT . Its
dynamics are characterized by
dDt
Dt
= µdt+ σD′t dωt,
where σDt is a N × 1 vector, where its j’th entry is equal to
Djtσ
Dt
, (3.2)
ωt is a N × 1 vector of the individual Brownian Motions and x′ signifies the transpose of
vector x. Complete derivation is available in the Appendix, (D.2).
Assets: The are N + 1 traded assets in the economy, N risky assets and a cash account.
For the sake of simplicity the cash account interest rate r, which is exogenous, is set to
zero. The risky assets are claims to the dividends paid at time T , where we denote the
price of asset j by Sjt and its dynamic by
dSjt = Sjt
(
µSjtdt+ σ
S′
jt dωt
)
. (3.3)
The asset price Sjt, its drift, µ
S
jt, and its vector of volatilities, σ
S
jt, are endogenous and
determined in equilibrium.
Institutions: There are M heterogeneous institutions, where institution’s i preference
over terminal wealth is characterized by
E
 1
1−R
(
WiT
SIiT
)1−R , (3.4)
where R is the risk aversion parameter assumed to be greater than one, R > 1, and SIiT is
the index. The i’th institution is endowed with λi shares of the total assets market, such
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that
∑M
i=1 λi = 1. Its wealth dynamics are characterized by
dWit = Witpi
′
it
(
µSt dt+ σ
S′
t dωt
)
, (3.5)
where pit is a vector of portfolio allocations invested in each asset, µ
S
t is a vector where the
j’th instance is characterized by µSjt and σ
S
t is a matrix where the j’th row is asset specific
vector of sensitivities characterized by σSjt.
1 The terminal wealth {WiT }Mi=1 and portfolio
allocations {piiT }Mi=1 are jointly determined in equilibrium.
Benchmarks: χ is a M ×N matrix representing the index configuration, where
χij =
 αij if the j’th asset is included in the benchmark of the i’th institution ,0 else
(3.6)
where αij is the weight of each asset in the ith benchmark and ni is the number of assets
in the i’th institution’s benchmark. The corresponding dividend cash-flow of holding the
index SIiT is characterized by the exogenous function IiT of the underlying dividends. The
set of admissible benchmarks Ii is characterized by
Ii ≡
{
IiT | dIit
Iit
≡ µIit dt+ σIi′t dωt, where µIit and σIit are positive, progressively measurable,
bounded and continuously differentiable functions of the dividends.} (3.7)
The set of admissible dividend functions, Ii, is associated with many possible indices we
observe in the data, such as arithmetic and geometric averages with general finite weights.
For example, a weighted arithmetic average of stock returns index is associated with the
exogenous dividend function characterized by IiT =
∑N
j=1 χijDjT , where αij = 1 for all as-
sets within the i’th benchmark, and an equally weighted geometric average of stock prices
index is associated with the exogenous dividend function characterized by
∏N
j=1 (DjT )
χij
1The wealth dynamics in (3.5) takes into consideration that r = 0
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where αij =
1
ni
for all assets within the i’th benchmark. The only viable restriction on the
index is that its associated exogenous dividend function has bounded drift and volatility
coefficients and that all dividends are paid at maturity. 2 Institutions’ objective func-
tions (3.4), incorporate the relative to the benchmark wealth concerns of institutions; they
strive to post higher returns when the benchmark is high, which translates into a positive
marginal utility of wealth with respect to the index, UWS > 0.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). Consider an economy with dividends given by (3.1), bench-
mark configuration given by (3.6) and benchmarks from (3.7). For initial endowments
of {λi}Mi=1 shares of the total asset market, such that
∑M
i=1 λi = 1, an equilibrium is
described by the stochastic processes {Sjt}Nj=1 and {piit}Mi=1, and the random variables
{WiT }Mi=1 adapted to the natural filtration generated by the vector of Brownian Motions,
{ωit, t ∈ [0, T ]}. Such that, given prices, {Sjt}Nj=1, each institution i optimally chooses piit
and WiT given its budget constraint (3.5) to maximize its utility (3.4), and markets clear:
consumption good market,
∑M
i=1WiT = DT , risky asset markets,
∑M
i=1Witpiit = St, and
the riskless asset market,
∑M
i=1Wit (1− pi′it1) = 0, where t ∈ [0, T ] and 1 is a N × 1 vector
of ones.
3.2 General Equilibrium
We obtain the asset pricing quantities and portfolio allocations by deriving the optimal
risk sharing rule, PiT . This quantity determines the share of the aggregate wealth that
each investor consumes at maturity. It is state dependent and related to the agent’s bench-
mark index. By using PiT we then obtain the pricing kernel MT , which also depends on
the index configuration. The no arbitrage condition then implies that asset prices equal
dividend payoffs when they materialize, SjT = DjT . Therefore instead of working with the
endogenous function of assets: SIiT , we can work with the exogenous function of dividends:
2Progressively measurable with respect to the natural filtration of the vector Browninan Motion,
{ωit, t ∈ [0, T ]}, and µIit : RN+ → R+ and σIit : RN+ → RN+.
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IiT . The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium sharing rule and pricing kernel.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium).
The optimal sharing rule, WiT = PiTDT , is characterized by
PiT =
Ai (IiT )
1− 1
R∑M
i=1Ai (IiT )
1− 1
R
(3.8)
and the pricing kernel, MT , is characterized by
MT = D
−R
T
(
M∑
i=1
AiI
1− 1
R
iT
)R
. (3.9)
The weight adjustment, Ai, is given by
Ai =
λi
λ1
E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R1T + ...+AiI1− 1RiT + ...+AMI1− 1RMT )R I1T
)1− 1
R

E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R1T + ...+AiI1− 1RiT + ...+AMI1− 1RMT )R IiT
)1− 1
R
 . (3.10)
For a fixed set of weight adjustments, {A1, A2, ..., Ai−1, Ai+1, ..., AM}, with finite values
there exist a unique fixed point that satisfies (3.10).
The Ai’s can be obtained by a couple of iterating procedures: First, we conjecture an
initial value for all the Ai’s. A good conjecture would be the no benchmarks case with
Ai =
λi
λ1
for all i = 1, 2, ...,M . In the outer iterating procedure, we iterate over the Ai’s
from i = 2, ...,M . In the inner iterating procedure, for each Ai, we fix the Aj for j 6= i and
iterate over equation (3.10) until convergence is achieved. We then fix this Ai as we move
on to a different Aj . The outer iterating procedure is terminated once all the Ai’s do not
change for a complete run over the whole batch.
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Furthermore, the results in Theorem 1 do not depend on the structure of the index:
as long as IiT is in Ii, the corresponding benchmark is feasible and the equilibrium result
holds. There are two different types of heterogeneities here: Institutions may differ in
which assets are included in their benchmarks, and they may also differ in how to allocate
different weights to each of these assets.
An important observation is that an economy where institutions have the exact same
benchmarks, i.e., herd, is equivalent to an economy with just one major institution with
the same initial share as the sum of the herding institutions. More formally, with CRRA
preference, when risk aversions are identical, it is possible to aggregate investors into a
single representative agent. However, due to heterogeneity in the indices, the aggregation
is possible only if their indices are identical. The next Proposition suggests that different
economies may differ in their equilibrium quantities only if after aggregating agents with
equivalent indices results in a different structure. Heterogeneity is then characterized only
by the different benchmarks and the initial endowments related to each benchmark.
Proposition 1 (Equivalence).
If we replace a subset of institutions with the same benchmark index, Iˆ, with a single aggre-
gate institution with initial share equals to
∑
i∈Iˆ λi, then equilibrium prices and portfolios
for the rest of the participants are unchanged.
The optimal share is a weighted average of the indices to the power of one minus the risk
tolerance. The weight of institution i is determined by the weight adjustment, Ai, which
is fixed overtime. In addition, the optimal share moves between zero and one with values
closer to one when the i’th index is doing relatively better than the rest of the indices and
closer to zero otherwise. Therefore, consumption of institution i is determined by how well
its index performs relative to others.
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In the representation above the weight adjustments are determined relative to the first
investor, i.e., A1 ≡ 1. Furthermore, they are comprised of two components: the initial
adustment, which corresponds to λiλ1 , divided by the risk adjustment, which corresponds to
E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R1T + ...+AiI1− 1RiT + ...+AMI1− 1RMT )R I1T
)1− 1
R

E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R1T + ...+AiI1− 1RiT + ...+AMI1− 1RMT )R IiT
)1− 1
R
 ,
in (3.10). The initial adjustment implies that institutions with large initial shares have
bigger effects on institutions’ shares. The risk adjustment, which measures the relative
performance of the indices, implies that institutions with indices that are on average pre-
forming relatively better, subsequently reduce their share of the aggregate by increasing
their risk adjustment. For example, suppose that high realizations of the i’th index are
pretty common and that high realizations of the k’th index are pretty rare. Then, the opti-
mal share of the i’th investor will be adjusted downward and the optimal share of the k’th
investor will be adjusted upward through their respective adjustment costs. In contrast,
in the baseline case with no benchmarks, the weight adjustments are reduced to the initial
adjustment and the optimal share of each market participant is solely determined by its
initial share.
The state price density in this economy has a multiplicative two factor structure. The
first is the aggregate dividend factor, D−RT , from the baseline Lucas economy case. The
second factor is the index factor,
(∑M
i=1AiI
1− 1
R
iT
)R
, and it arises from the benchmarking
concerns of institutions. It is a weighted average of the different benchmarks according
to their weight adjustments. The index factor is what drives the differences in between
equilibrium quantities of indexed and non indexed assets.
23
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium Asset Prices and Portfolio Allocations).
Market prices of risk are
θt = REt
[
MT
Et [MT ]
σDT
]
− (R− 1)
M∑
i=1
Et
[
MT
Et [MT ]
PiT
HIit,T
IiT
]
χi. (3.11)
Asset volatilities are
σSjt = σej +REt
[(
MT
Et [MT ]
− MTDjT
Et [MTDjT ]
)
σDT
]
− (R− 1)
M∑
i=1
Et
[(
MT
Et [MT ]
− MTDjT
Et [MTDjT ]
)
PiT
HIit,T
IiT
]
χi. (3.12)
Optimal portfolios (wealth volatilities) are
σS′t piit = θt +
R− 1
R
Et
 I1−
1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
Et
[
I
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
]HIit,T
IiT
 χ¯i (3.13)
− (R− 1)Et
 I1−
1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
Et
[
I
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
]σDT
+ (R− 1)2R
M∑
k=1
Et
 I1−
1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
Et
[
I
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
]P kT HIkt,TIkT
χk.
The i’th institution’s wealth is given by Wit =
Et[MTPiTDT ]
Et[MT ]
, the j’th asset price is given
by Sjt =
Et[MTDjT ]
Et[MT ]
, where χi is the i’th row of matrix χ, signifying the i’th institution
benchmarked assets and ej is a unit vector and H
Ii
t,T defined in (D.14), is a general hedging
demand against fluctuations in Iit for t ∈ [0, T ].
There are two hedging demands in this framework: aggregate hedging, E[(·)σDT ] and
index hedging, E[(·)PiTHIit,T /IiT ]. In the first, participants hedge against future fluctua-
tions in the aggregate dividend volatility. It is not unique to our framework as it present
in any dynamic model with stochastic investment opportunity set. Whereas in the second,
market participants hedge against future fluctuations in the index holdings of all market
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participants, which is captured by their optimal share multiplied by their corresponding
indices. It is unique to our model and arises due to institutional benchmarking motives.
R > 1 is an important ingredient of the results, because when R = 1, log utility preference,
the index hedging component vanishes and assets’ characteristics become identical.
Chapter 4
Implications of Benchmarks’ Heterogeneity
For the sake of simplicity for the rest of the thesis we assume that there are only two
institutions with equal initial endowment, and geometric average with equal weights index
structure; they may differ only in which assets are included in their benchmarks.1
IiT ≡
N∏
j=1
(DjT )
χij ,
χij is defined in (3.6) with αij =
1
ni
. The asset pricing quantities and portfolio allocations
are then characterized by plugging HIit,T = σIiT and are explicitly derived in Appendix B.
Empirical evidence suggests that funds differ in their industry concentration and in-
vestment styles and choose their benchmarking indices accordingly: sector-specific funds
concentrate their holdings on the sector they are specialized in, which entails a sector-
specific benchmark, and style-specific funds choose assets that corresponds with the style
they invest in, which entails a style-specific benchmark. Both cases suggests that hetero-
geneity in benchmarks exist and is relevant. In this section we study the heterogeneity
effects of benchmarks. In a series of comparisons between different index configurations
1Results for arithmetic averages of assets’ returns are described in Appendix C. Geometric averages are
common in practice, our index specification exactly matches the S&P500 Commodity Index (SPCI). It
is a good proxy for institutional benchmarking concerns in stock markets. In addition, the choice of an
equally weighted geometric average buys us simpler analytical expressions as well as tractability. When
institutions do not have benchmarks, we can simply set the corresponding dividend function IiT ≡ 1,
essentially, removing the benchmarking concerns of institutions. Therefore, the case of retail investor with
no benchmark is nested within the geometric average benchmark specification. Furthermore, the weight of
each asset in the benchmark is self determined and equals to 1/ni.
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we draw conclusions on how the index configuration affects asset prices. This comparative
statics exercise provides guidelines on how market characteristics change once we change
the index configuration.
In general, asset prices and market prices of risk are influenced by the number of insti-
tutions that benchmark them, their initial share and their benchmark indices. Proposition
2 provides analytical comparisons in a specific setting.
Proposition 2 (Asset Prices Effects).
Suppose that any institution i who benchmarks asset l also benchmarks asset k: χ·,k ≥ χ·,l,
and that the information about the future dividends is the same across assets, at time t
then
1. Slt ≤ Skt
2. θlt ≥ θkt
where t ∈ [0, T ].
Proposition 2 provides theoretical foundations for comparing asset prices while keeping the
index configuration fixed. We use these results to support the illustrations in this section.
Strikingly, even though prices of assets with equivalent cash flow distributions diverge from
one another, there are no arbitrage opportunities. The reason being that even if informa-
tion about the dividend cash flows is the same across assets at some point in time t, there is
no guarantee that the actual payoff will be same in the future. Therefore, if an arbitrageur
takes a short position in Skt and a long position in Slt, the actual dividend payoffs paid at
maturity may result in a loss.
For simplicity purposes let us assume that there are two institutions with the same
initial share and ten assets that each institution can decide whether to include or exclude
in its benchmark before the markets start to unfold. Benchmarks then remain fixed and
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cannot be changed.
The benchmarking heterogeneity can be characterized by four types of assets.
Definition 2 (Types of Assets).
• type10: assets that are included only in the first benchmark
• type01: assets that are included only in the second benchmark
• type00: assets that are excluded from both benchmarks
• type11: assets that are included in both benchmarks
n10, n01, n00 and n11 denote the number of type specific assets, respectively.
For example, the index configuration given by χ1χ2 =
1100000111
0011000111 is decomposed to two assets
of type10, two assets of type01, three assets of type00 and three assets of type11. In this
characterization types’ locations do no matter for type specific asset prices and portfolio
allocations. Dividend streams are identical, and the driving force of the wedge between
asset prices is determined by how many institutions benchmark the asset. In our example,
χ1
χ2
= 00011111000001110011 generates the same types specific asset pricing quantities. Therefore, the
number of assets from each type is what determines types’ equilibrium prices and portfolio
allocations.2 In all examples we use the following order of types from left to right, type10,
type01, type00 and type11.
In this setting benchmarks are determined only by the number of assets included in
the benchmark. The weight of each asset is determined by the number of benchmarked
assets. We call this number the size of the benchmark. The relative benchmark sizes
in the index configuration are some of the main driving forces affecting asset prices and
portfolio allocations. In cases where one benchmark is wide and the other is narrow prices
2For the simplicity of representation and without losing the economic intuition we assume that at the
time of comparison, information about the dividend payoffs is identical, i.e., Dit = Djt, for ∀i, j = 1, 2, .., N .
However, it is possible to look at conditional distributions of asset prices and portfolio allocations in general.
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and portfolio allocations across benchmarks diverge. Whereas when both benchmarks are
either narrow or wide prices and portfolio allocations across benchmarks are equivalent:
when benchmark sizes are identical asset prices and portfolio allocations are symmetric.
Definition 3 (Symmetry).
Let µ be the measure of asymmetry characterized by
µ =
|n1 − n2|
N
. (4.1)
We say that the index configuration χ is symmetric when µ = 0. n1 and n2 are the sizes
of benchmarks 1 and 2 respectively.3
The measure µ is in [0, 1], it equals 0 when benchmarks are symmetric and it equals 1
when one institution is fully diversified and the other has no benchmark. When the index
configuration χ is symmetric asset prices and portfolio allocations assets are identical.
Proposition 3 (Symmetry). If µ = 0, the initial share is identical and dividends’ initial
levels are equal at time t then
1. S10t = S
01
t
2. θ10t = θ
01
t
3. σ10t = σ
01
t
1. pi101t = pi
01
2t
2. pi011t = pi
10
2t
3. pi111t = pi
11
2t
where t ∈ [0, T ] and the superscripts 10 and 01 correspond to type10 and type01 assets,
respectively.
This proposition shows that when sizes of benchmarks are identical asset prices of
type10 and type01 assets are the same. As we deviate from the symmetric case, the dif-
3Symmetry is defined for economies with two institutional investors. A broader definition of symmetry
for cases with more than two institutions may be defined. Though, it is much more complex and diverges
from the purpose of this section.
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ference between benchmark sizes affects the asset prices and portfolio allocations as the
illustrations in this section show. It is a major driving force of price divergence.
In the following sections we provide extensive illustrations on how the difference in
the benchmarks affect the asset prices and portfolio allocations. We start the analysis by
examining how portfolio allocations differ for the different types of assets. Aligned with
Basak and Pavlova (2013), our model predicts that when there is only one benchmark, the
institution tilts its portfolio towards it. However, when several benchmarks are present, the
magnitude of the tilt and the amount invested in the overlapping and independent parts of
the benchmarks very much depend on the index configuration. First, due to diversification
within type motives, institutions allocate their funds equally among assets of the same
type. Second, institutions play a retail investor role and provide supply for the other
institution in assets exclusively in the other institutions’ benchmark.4 Third, interestingly,
institutions invest lower fractions of wealth in assets that are included in both benchmarks
than assets that are only included in their benchmarks. In some sense, each institution
plays a retail investor role and provides some supply for the other institution by essentially
decreasing its own demand for these assets.
4.1 Effects of Asymmetry
In this section we show how the asymmetry in the index configuration controlled by µ
affects asset prices and portfolio allocations, while controlling for the common component.
When the index configuration becomes asymmetric one benchmark is increasing in size and
the other benchmark is decreasing in size. The increasing benchmark and its institution
are denoted by I while the decreasing benchmark and its institution are denoted by D.
Figure 4.1 shows the sensitivity of the portfolio allocations to changes in asymmetry,
4Retail investors are investors with no benchmarks. When an institution does not benchmark an asset
that the other institution does, its asset holdings are similar to the asset holdings in a similar economy with
one institutional investor and a retail investor.
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µ. In the top panel we observe the common components of the index configuration and
in the bottom panel the independent components of the index configuration. Due to di-
versification motives: 1) the I (D) institution decreases (increases) its holding in each of
the overlapping assets as µ increases. 2) the I (D) institution also decreases (increases) its
holding in assets exclusively in its benchmark and increases (decreases) its holding in assets
exclusively benchmarked by the D (I) institution. Lastly, we observe that the cash account
remains zero for any level of asymmetry, because there are always better investments than
investment in the cash account.
Exclusively benchmarked assets and commonly benchmarked assets respond differently
to changes in asymmetry. Intuitively, prices of the I (D) benchmark decrease (increase),
their market prices of risk increase (decrease) and their volatilities decrease (increase) as the
asymmetry increases. The I benchmarked assets’ prices decrease because now the bench-
marking demand pressure is dispersed among more assets. Tilting the portfolio implies
that the benchmarked assets are more sensitive to cash flow shocks within the benchmark
than to cash flow shocks outside the benchmark; a cash flow shock within the benchmark
has a greater effect on portfolio holdings than a cash flow shock outside the benchmark,
implying that their volatilities are higher. As asymmetry increases the I benchmark sensi-
tivity to shocks within the benchmark decreases, because now a smaller fraction of wealth
is invested in each asset, thereby effects of a cash flow shock on portfolio adjustments are
mitigated. Market prices of risk of benchmarked assets are lower than market prices of
risk of non benchmarked assets. Equilibrium implies that assets within a benchmark are
undesirable investments to market participants without benchmarking motives in these as-
sets. This result is obtained by decreasing the market prices of risk of benchmarked assets.
As asymmetry increases the I benchmarked assets’ market prices of risk increase. The
benchmarking institution is more diversified within the benchmark, therefore maintaining
equilibrium implies that the decline in market prices of risk is mitigated.
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(a) pi11t
(b) piIt
(c) pi00t
(d) piDt
Figure 4.1: In these graphs we fix the common component, n11 = 1 and n00 = 1 and show
how portfolio allocations depend on the relative size measure µ. The top panel reflects
the portfolio allocations in the common components and the lower panel in the individual
components. The 11 subscript represents an asset common to both benchmarks and the 00
subscript represents an asset excluded from both benchmarks. piI reflects the holdings in
the individual components of the increasing benchmark and piD reflects the holdings in the
individual components of the decreasing benchmark. Equivalently, I represents an asset
exclusively within the increasing size benchmark and D represents an asset exclusively
within the decreasing size benchmark. Parameters are µ = 0.03, σ = 0.15, λ1 = λ2 = 0.5,
Dj0 = 1 for j = 1, ..., 6, T = 3 and R = 4.
However commonly benchmarked asset prices increase, their market prices of risk de-
crease and their volatilities increase as asymmetry increases. There are two opposing eco-
nomic interactions at play. In the first interaction, the addition to the I benchmark implies
that prices and volatilities decrease, and market prices of risk increase for assets within it,
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while in the second interaction the deletion from the D benchmark implies that prices and
volatilities increase, and market prices of risk decrease for assets within it. The driver of
this result is the fact that addition or deletion from a narrow benchmark affects asset prices
more strongly than deletion or addition from a wide benchmark. A consequence of this
result is that assets within each institution’s benchmark might have very different pricing
quantities depending on the index configuration, as can be seen in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1.
Assets’ volatilities can be thought of as sensitivities to cash flow shocks. We find that
benchmarked assets’ sensitivity to cash flow shocks within the benchmark is higher than
the sensitivity to cash flow shocks excluded from the benchmark. In other words, when a
positive cash flow shock hits a benchmarked asset the corresponding gains are distributed
among the benchmarked assets more than among the non benchmarked assets. In addition,
the institution may take a short position on the assets exclusively in the other institution’s
benchmark to the extent allowed by its other holdings, implying that the sensitivity across
benchmarks might be negative. The index configuration determines the magnitude of the
sensitivity within and across benchmarks. In Figure 4.3, the left panel we observe that the
correlation across benchmarks decreases as asymmetry increases due to a sharp increase in
the volatilities of D benchmarked assets. In the right panel we observe that the correlation
within the benchmark is different for the I and the D benchmarks. As the I benchmark
increases, the fraction of wealth invested in each asset within it decreases and so are the
sensitivities to cash-flow shocks, therefore correlations among assets within it decreases.
4.2 Effects of the Common Components
In this section, we fix the independent component controlled by the asymmetry µ and
analyze how changes in the common components affect asset prices and portfolio alloca-
tions. We find that the narrower the benchmarks the higher the benchmarking effects on
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(a) St
(b) St
(c) θt
(d) θt
(e) σt
(f) σt
Figure 4.2: In these graphs we fix the common component, n11 = 1 and n00 = 1 and show
how asset prices depend on the relative size measure µ. The top panel reflects asset prices
of the common components and the lower panel asset prices of the individual components.
The 11 subscript represents an asset common to both benchmarks and the 00 subscript
represents an asset excluded from both benchmarks. I represents an asset exclusively
within the increasing size benchmark and D represents an asset exclusively within the
decreasing size benchmark. Parameters are the same as in Figure 4.1.
asset prices and portfolio allocations. This is captured by looking at the difference between
commonly non benchmarked and commonly benchmarked assets, n00 − n11.
First, non benchmarked assets’ prices and portfolio allocations are only mildly affected
by the different index configurations, pi00t ≈ 0.10, S00t ≈ 1.06 and θ00t ≈ 0.06 for any in-
dex configuration. These assets are not exposed to index hedging and only affected by
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(a) ρ
(I,D)
t (b) ρ
(I,11)
t , ρ
(D,11)
t (c) ρ
(I,I)
t , ρ
(D,D)
t
Figure 4.3: In these graphs we show how the correlations within and across benchmarks
depend on the relative size measure µ, while keeping the common components fixed n11 = 1
and n00 = 1. The correlations are characterized by ρ
(j1,j2)
t = σ
s′
j1t
σsj2t/‖σsj1t‖‖σsj2t‖, where
σsj1t and σ
s
j2t
are type specific. Parameters are the same as in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.3a
reflects the correlation across benchmarks and Figure 4.3b reflects the correlation within
benchmarks. 11 represents an asset common to both benchmarks. I represents an asset
exclusively within the increasing size benchmark and D represents an asset exclusively
within the decreasing size benchmark. Parameters are the same as in Figure 4.1.
aggregate hedging. Because the aggregate hedging component does not fluctuate much
with changes in the index configuration these asset prices’ and portfolio allocations barely
change.
Second, institutions may take short positions on the other institution’s benchmarked
assets to the extent allowed by their other holdings serving as collateral, as shown in the
last row, the portfolio allocation pi011t in Table 4.1. More surprisingly they may also take
short positions on their own benchmark as shown in the first row, the portfolio allocation
pi111t in Table 4.1. Furthermore, when the size of the benchmarks is identical S
10
t = S
01
t and
θ10t = θ
01
t as implied by Proposition 3, and, S
11
t ≥ S10t , S01t and θ11t ≥ θ10t , θ01t , as implied
by Proposition 2 implies.
Third, the total wealth of institutions incurs an upward jump when a retail investor
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Effects of the Common Component on Asset Prices
χ1
χ2
µ n00 − n11 S10t S01t S11t θ10t θ01t θ11t
1 10000000010100000001 0 6 1.12 1.12 1.17 −0.05 −0.05 −0.16
2 10000001110100000111 0 2 1.09 1.09 1.12 0.00 0.00 −0.05
3 10000111110100011111 0 -2 1.08 1.08 1.11 0.02 0.02 −0.01
4 10011111110101111111 0 -6 1.08 1.08 1.09 0.03 0.03 0.00
5 11100000010001000001 0.2 4 1.09 1.12 1.15 0.00 −0.05 −0.11
6 11100001110001000111 0.2 0 1.08 1.09 1.11 0.02 0.00 −0.03
7 11100111110001011111 0.2 -4 1.08 1.08 1.10 0.03 0.02 −0.01
Effects of the Common Component on Portfolio Allocations
χ1
χ2
µ n00 − n11 pi101t pi011t pi111t cash1 pi102t pi012t pi112t cash2 W1 +W2
1 11000000010000000001 0.2 7 0.23 − −0.14 0.00 −0.02 − 0.36 0.00 10.87
2 11000000000000000000 0.2 8 0.29 − − −0.37 0.01 − − 0.37 10.75
3 11100000010000000001 0.3 5 0.19 − −0.17 0.00 −0.02 − 0.36 0.00 10.87
4 11100000000000000000 0.3 6 0.23 − − −0.37 −0.02 − − 0.37 10.75
5 11111000000000010000 0.4 4 0.17 −0.27 0.00 0.03 0.48 − 0.00 10.87
Table 4.1: S00t ≈ 1.06, θ00t ≈ 0.06 and pi00t ≈ 0.10 for any index configuration. Parameters
are the same as in Figure 4.1.
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becomes an institutional investor with benchmarking motives, as observed in Table 4.1.
Introducing the second benchmark has two effects. In the first, the second institution tilts
its portfolio towards its benchmarked assets, thereby increasing demands for these assets,
pushing up their prices. In the second, the first institution increases its holdings on its
benchmark financed by taking a short position on the second institution’s benchmark which
further increases assets prices within the first benchmark. In total, the two effects increase
prices implying that the total economic wealth jumps up.5
Lastly, when both institutions have benchmarking motives it is not optimal to invest in
the cash account. Economically, it means that institutions find it more attractive to hold a
short position on assets in the other institution’s benchmark than holding the zero market
price of risk cash investment. In contrast, this is not the case when only one institution
has benchmarking motives. In such cases, the institution takes a short position on the cash
account, to the extent allowed by its other holdings, while the retail investor takes a long
position, as shown in Table 4.1 in the cash1 and in the cash2 columns.
4.3 Effects of Fundamental Volatility
We now turn our focus to how changes in dividend information volatilities affect asset
prices and portfolio allocations. Increasing dividend information volatilities imply that
current information about the future cash flows is more noisy and reveals less about the
materialized payoffs. In cases where either both institutions benchmark a fully diversified
benchmark or both institutions have no benchmark, increasing cash flow volatilities do not
affect portfolio holdings, because institutions cannot mitigate the effects of the noise by
reallocating funds. Subsequently asset prices fall, because volatilities increase and market
prices of risk fall when dividends are more volatile. However, in other benchmark con-
figurations institutions can mitigate the effects of the increase in cash flow volatility by
5Market clearing conditions imply that total economic wealth is equal to the market capitalization, the
sum of all asset prices.
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reallocating their funds. In such cases asset prices and market prices of risk might rise
and asset volatilities might fall as the cash flow volatilities increase. As before, the type of
asset and the index configuration determines how the change in cash flow volatilities affect
asset prices and portfolio allocations.
Institutions’ benchmarking concerns imply that they revert funds to their benchmarks
in episodes of high cash flow volatility: what we call the flight to benchmark property.
As the fundamental volatility increases institutions shift funds from the non benchmarked
assets to the benchmarked assets: they become more concentrated in their benchmarks.
As was previously emphasized, institutions’ holdings in the non benchmarked assets are
unaffected by changes in the index configuration, therefore, the less dispersed the bench-
mark the more funds are allocated to other assets, implying that institutions can allocate
more funds towards the benchmark when fundamental volatility increases, which results in
bigger price distortions.
(a) St (b) θt (c) pi1t
Figure 4.4: In these graphs we present the asset pricing quantities of the different types.
The full, dashed and dotted lines characterize type00, type11 and type10 assets respectively,
and the index configuration is characterized by χ1χ2 =
1100000001
0011000001 . Parameters are the same
as in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the effects of asset prices and portfolios as the fundamental volatil-
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ity increases. The demand pressure on the commonly benchmarked assets is stronger be-
cause both institutions revert their funds to the same assets, implying that the distortion
in asset prices is stronger. Furthermore, when the fundamental volatility reaches a certain
level, institutions’ reactions to the increase in the fundamental volatility decrease, because
the negative effects on payoffs become stronger than the positive effects of the increase in
demands.
Chapter 5
Endogenous Benchmarks
In this chapter we derive the optimal endogenous benchmarks choices. We first layout the
economic setting allowing institutions to choose their benchmarks given prices. We then
show how this problem can be solved numerically, by first conjecturing an optimal index
configuration and then checking if the institutions deviate from the conjectured optimal
index configuration. If non of the institutions deviate, the conjecture is optimal. Lastly,
we provide two examples, one when the conjectured index configuration is optimal and the
other when the conjectured index configuration is not optimal.
The discussion about optimal benchmark was previously explored in a contractual con-
text. In a principal-agent framework, the investor offers to the manager a compensation
contract that optimally enforces the manager to closely follow the benchmark. Most of the
models in the literature consider a partial equilibrium setting, where prices and benchmarks
are exogenously predetermined. However, when the main objective is to explore asset pric-
ing implications of benchmarks, the equilibrium conditions must be taken into account and
may affect institutions’ optimal behavior. Furthermore, in richer settings where institu-
tions also choose which assets to include in the benchmark their optimal behavior may be
affected.1
In contrast, we derive the optimal benchmarks when prices and index choices are en-
1This literature includes Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985), Starks (1987), Stoughton (1993), Heinkel
and Stoughton (1994), Das and Sundaram (2002), Palomino and Prat (2003), Larsen (2005), Liu (2005),
Cadenillasa et al. (2007), Li and Tiwari (2009) and Lioui and Poncet (2013).
40
dogenously and jointly determined. We abstract from the frictions underlying the principal-
agent problem and assume that each reported benchmark arises from an optimal contract,
given prices. This means that, the optimal contract in this setting does not have the fund
flow effect because the manager and the investors agree on the benchmark prior to report-
ing. When all the different institutions report their benchmarks and prices are revealed
we can identify if the benchmarks are optimal for the given prices. For a given reported
index configuration, if institutions unanimously decide not to deviate, then the reported
benchmarks represent the optimal index configuration. In the case where institutions are
obliged to report benchmarks, the optimal index configuration arises when all institutions
are fully diversified and follow the exact same benchmark, i.e., herd. This result implies
that there is a substantial additional cost for the principal to offer the manager an optimal
benchmark contract that is not the fully diversified index. For example, fund managers
require higher fees for benchmarking the Russell 1000 Growth index as opposed to the
S&P500 index.
More formally, the value function of institution i is given by
v0 (IiT ) = κˆi
(
E
[(
MˆT IiT
)1− 1
R
])R
, (5.1)
where κˆi is a constant and MˆT is the pricing kernel, both are determined by the reported
benchmarks. Each institution then maximize its value function over the set of all possible
indices
max
χi
{v0 (IiT )} . (5.2)
In this simple maximization problem, each institution chooses which assets to include in its
benchmark, the weight of each asset in the benchmark is determined by the total number
of assets in the benchmark, or the benchmark size. This is captured by χi, defined in 3.6
and specialized to the case of geometric average benchmarks described in Appendix B.
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If the reported index configuration equals the index configuration that maximizes every
institution’s value function then the reported benchmarks are in fact optimal. In this
simplified maximization problem, institution i controls only which assets are included in
its index. The weights of the benchmarked assets are self determined and distributed
equally, conforming with the economic setup in Section 3.1. Furthermore, we assume
that institutions are fully committed to their time zero benchmark. Meaning institutions
commit to their time zero reported benchmark and afterwards deviation is not allowed. In
order to be consistent with the economic framework in Section 3.1 we model institutions
as price takers. One can think of each institution as an aggregate of infinitely small
institutions that cannot affect prices. Interestingly, the strategic case does not change
the optimal benchmark choice, institutions optimally benchmark the same fully diversified
index even when considering the index choices effects on prices as well.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Index Configuration).
When institutions’ benchmarks are equally weighted geometric averages, the number of
institutions and the number of assets is finite, it is possible to derive the optimal index
configuration by iterating over all possible configurations.
Corollary 1. When there are only four assets and two institutions, the optimal index con-
figuration is unique and is obtained when institutions benchmark the same fully diversified
index, subject to the constraint that institutions must report a benchmark.
The choices of indices have two effects on the optimal benchmark. The first is an aggregate
effect, because other institutions’ benchmarks affect each individual optimal share, they
also affect the individual institution choice of benchmark. The second effect is an individual
effect, each institution choice of benchmark implies a different discounting of the optimal
share, a different distortion to the objective beliefs according to the choice of benchmark.
These two effects together determine the optimal index configuration.
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The previous literature originated by Bailey (1990) and Rennie and Cowhey (1990) ar-
gues that the fund investor’s preference determines the optimal benchmark. For example,
if the investor cares about growth stocks, then the manager should benchmark the Russell
1000 growth index. However, previous theoretical results do not consider the endogenous
effects of prices and indices. In contrast, this thesis shows that when other institutions’
benchmarks are taken into account and equilibrium prices are revealed, the optimal bench-
marks are fully diversified. Remember, this result assumes that each reported benchmark
arises from an optimal contract. It means that managers need to be compensated for
deviating from the fully diversified benchmark. Because in this framework there is no ad-
ditional compensation for deviating from the fully diversified benchmark the only possible
optimal benchmark is the fully diversified one. Therefore, this result is aligned with the
fund flow argument: fund investors agree on the benchmark with the managers. In our
example, a fund investor who cares about growth stocks will have to substantially increase
the manager’s compensation to make him deviate from the S&P500 index.2
Table 5.1 represents the gains by deviating from the reported benchmark represented
by χ¯1 = χ¯2 = 1111. When institutions do not deviate their benefits are highest, meaning
χ1 = χ2 = 1111 is the optimal benchmark. It is obtained when both institutions are fully
diversified and herd; they both hold the same fully diversified index. These outcomes are
robust to changes in participants’ initial share and to the addition of a retail investor with
no benchmark.
In contrast, Table 5.2, represents the gains by deviating from the reported benchmark
represented by χ¯1 = 0011, χ¯2 = 0001. No deviation is not optimal, meaning χ1 = 0011,
χ2 = 0001 is not an optimal benchmark. This outcome is robust to changes in participants’
initial share λi, and to the addition of a retail investor with no benchmark.
2This framework is a first step towards understanding how endogenizing benchmarks affects equilibrium
asset pricing. A richer setting should also take into account the optimal contract problem of each individual
institution. In such framework there are additional sources of feedbacks that will jointly determine prices
and endogenous benchmarks.
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Deviations from the reported benchmarks, χ¯1 = χ¯2 = 1111
0000 0001 0011 0111 1111
0000 -9.99,-9.99 -12.26,-9.99 -11.82,-9.99 -11.68,-9.99 -11.61,-9.99
0001 -9.99,-12.26 -12.26,-12.26 -11.82,-12.26 -11.68,-12.26 -11.61,-12.26
0011 -9.99,-11.82 -12.26,-11.82 -11.82,-11.82 -11.68,-11.82 -11.61,-11.82
0111 -9.99, -11.68 -12.26,-11.68 -11.82,-11.68 -11.68,-11.68 -11.61,-11.68
1111 -9.99, -11.61 -12.26,-11.61 -11.82,-11.61 -11.68,-11.61 -11.61,-11.61
0010 -11.82,-12.25
0110 -11.82,-11.82 -11.68, -11.82
1110 -11.82,-11.68 -11.68, -11.68
0100 -11.68, -12.26
1100 -11.68, -11.82
1000 -11.68, -12.25
1001 -11.68,-11.82
1011 -11.68,-11.68
Table 5.1: In the case where institutions are required to report a benchmark, χi 6= 0000,
i = 1, 2, the optimal index configuration is obtained when χ1 = χ2 = 1111, meaning
institutions do not deviate from the reported benchmarks, as the red marking shows. The
payoffs are in utils and the parameters are as in Figure 4.1.
Deviations from the reported benchmarks, χ¯1 = 0011 and χ¯2 = 0001
0000 0001 0011 0111 1111
0000 -9.21,-9.21 -14.04,-9.21 -12.15,-9.21 -11.17,-9.21 -10.70,-9.21
0001 -9.21,-14.04 -14.04,-14.04 -12.15,-14.04 -11.17,-14.04 -10.70,-14.04
0011 -9.21,-12.15 -14.04,-12.15 -12.15,-12.15 -11.17,-12.15 -10.70,-12.15
0111 -9.21,-11.17 -14.04,-11.17 -12.15,-11.17 -11.17,-11.17 -10.70,-11.17
1111 -9.21,-10.70 -14.04,-10.70 -12.15,-10.70 -11.17,-10.70 -10.70,-10.70
0010 -14.04,-11.31
0110 -14.04,-10.33 -12.15,-10.33
1110 -14.04,-10.02 -12.15,-10.02
0100 -12.15,-10.14
1100 -12.15,-9.77
1000 -11.17,-10.13
1001 -11.17,-11.51
1011 -11.17,-11.16
Table 5.2: In the case where institutions are required to report a benchmark, χi 6= 0000,
i = 1, 2, the optimal index configuration is obtained when χ1 = χ2 = 1111, meaning
institutions deviate from the reported benchmarks χ¯1 = 0011, χ¯2 = 0001, as the red
marking shows. Parameters are as in Table 5.1.
Chapter 6
Different Compensation Scheme
In this chapter we derive the asset pricing and portfolio allocations for a level subsistence
preference structure, defined below. Modeling institutions with this type of preference
implies that the size of the institutional sector does not affect asset prices, which is in con-
trast with empirical evidence suggesting that the size of the institutional sector should be
reflected in prices: i) Chen et al. (2004) show that in more recent years the stock inclusion
effect is stronger, implying that the appreciation in prices due to addition of an asset to an
index is much higher. ii) Barberis et al. (2005) show the same for asset class comovement.
Therefore, any model suggesting that institutions are responsible for these effects must also
be consistent with the empirical fact that the institutional sector has increased in recent
years, as was shown in Blume and Keim (2012). However, as we show in this chapter, level
subsistence benchmark implies that the size of the institutional sector does not affect prices.
In the previous literature, this type of preference structure used to be the main approach
to model benchmarking institutions. It was first introduced by Brennan (1993) and was
extended to continuous time dynamic model by Cuoco and Kaniel (2011). It has been
documented in the empirical literature, Bailey (1990), that return based level subsistence
type fees are widely used in many different constellations and forms. However, in our setting
we abstract away from the agency friction between fund investors and fund managers.
In such cases it is no longer obvious why level subsistence compensation that describes
each individual contract separately while taking prices and benchmarks as given, is the
appropriate tool for modeling the endogenous asset prices. From a different perspective,
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one can think of our relative subsistence preference structure as a value function arising
from solving an optimal contract problem with level subsistence while taking prices and
benchmarks as given. In fact, we show that relative subsistence is more suitable to capture
the asset pricing implications of institutional investors benchmarking motives. Based on
Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) characterization, the institutions’ preferences are characterized
by
U (WiT ) = E

(
βiWiT + γi
(
WiT − SIiT
))1−R
1−R
 . (6.1)
To illustrate our point and to closely follow the setting in Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), we
assume here that the index composition is a weighted sum of returns, exactly as Cuoco
and Kaniel (2011) suggested. However, the equilibrium result, asset prices and portfolio
allocations support different choices of benchmark along the lines of Chapter 3. More
rigorously, for agent i the index is characterized by
SIit =
N∑
j=1
χijSjt (6.2)
The corresponding exogenous index is Iit =
∑N
j=1 χijDjt. As established in Chapter 3, the
no arbitrage condition implies that SIiT = IiT .
Theorem 3 (Equilibrium).
The optimal sharing rule, WiT = PiTDT , is characterized by
PiT = Ki
(
1−
M∑
n=1
γn
(βn + γn)
InT
DT
+
M∑
n=1
γi
(βn + γn)
Ai,n
IiT
DT
)
, (6.3)
and the pricing kernel, MT , is characterized by
MT = D
−R
T
(
1−
M∑
n=1
γn
βn + γn
InT
DT
)−R
. (6.4)
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Ai,n and Ki are given by
Ai,n =
λn (βn + γn)E [ξTDT ]− γnE [ξT InT ]
λi (βi + γi)E [ξTDT ]− γiE [ξT IiT ] , (6.5)
Ki =
(
M∑
n=1
βi + γi
βn + γn
Ai,n
)−1
. (6.6)
If the following condition applies
λi (βi + γi)
γi
>
E [MT IiT ]
E [MTDT ]
, (6.7)
for i = 1, 2, ..,M .
It is obvious from Theorem 3 that the pricing kernel does not depend on the initial share
of institutions, because, λi’s, do not affect the pricing kernel. That is to say, whether
the institutional sector is allocated with 99 precent share of the economy or 1 percent
share of the economy has no effect on prices, which is counterfactual to the empirical
evidence described in the beginning of this chapter, suggesting that institutional sectors
sizes affect asset prices. For example, the market anomalies described in Chapter 7 are more
pronounced in recent years, as the institutions’ share of the economy is larger. Condition
(6.7) imposes a restriction on the fraction of wealth that each institution has to maintain
non-benchmarked. In one extreme case the institution may have all its wealth benchmarked
and in the other all its wealth not benchmarked. This restriction implies that institutions
must have some wealth not benchmarked for an equilibrium to exist.
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium quantities.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium Asset Prices and Portfolio Allocations).
Market prices of risks are given by
θt = REt
 M1+ 1RT
Et [MT ]
(
σDT DT −
M∑
i=1
γi
(βi + γi)
σIiT IiT
) . (6.8)
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Asset volatilities are given by
σSjt = σej +REt
 M1+ 1RT
Et [MT ]
− M
1+ 1
R
T DjT
Et [MTDjT ]
(σDT DT − M∑
i=1
γi
(βi + γi)
σIiT IiT
) . (6.9)
Optimal portfolios (wealth volatilities) are given by
σSt φit =Witθt+
KiEt
[
MT
Et [MT ]
(
σDT DT −
M∑
n=1
γn
(βn + γn)
σInT InT
)
(
1−R
(
1 +
M∑
n=1
γi
(βn + γn)
Ai,nIiTM
1
R
T
))]
+Ki
M∑
n=1
γi
(βn + γn)
Ai,nEt
[
MT
Et [MT ]
σIiT IiT
]
, (6.10)
where φt ≡ Witpit. The i’th institution’s wealth is given by Wit = Et[MTPiTDT ]Et[MT ] , the j’th
asset price is given by Sjt =
Et[MTDjT ]
Et[MT ]
. σIiT , the volatility coefficient of IiT , is the hedging
demand against fluctuations in IiT .
In level benchmark case there are also two hedging components. The first one, E
[
(·)σDT DT
]
,
as before, is hedging against future fluctuations in the aggregate volatility. The second one,
E
[
(·)σIiT IiT
]
, is hedging against future fluctuations in each of the indices’ volatilities. As
in the previous benchmarking scheme, the two hedging components have opposites effects:
the first is positive while the second is negative. In addition, the magnitudes of the effects
are increasing with the risk aversion coefficient.
The equilibrium quantities in the relative benchmark case and the level benchmark case
have a few fundamental differences. First, in the level benchmark case, the pricing kernel
does not price differently the idiosyncratic shocks differently. As a result there is no sen-
sitivity of the benchmarked assets to changes in the fundamental volatility, consequently,
the asset prices of benchmark assets slightly increase in the presence of institutions, in
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contrast with the relative benchmark case, where the increase is substantial.
Table 6.1 summarizes the differences between the equilibrium quantities for a set of
parameters that is comparable between the different structures. We use the exact same
parameters as in Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) for the level subsistence preference, in the rela-
tive subsistence preference we used similar parameters when appropriate and we allocated
the shares equally among the two market participants. In both cases, we used three dif-
ferent index configurations, independent benchmarks, overlapping benchmarks and one
benchmark with a retail investor, and used an economy with four stocks over a time hori-
zon of three years.
Let us draw the attention to the parts of Table 6.1 that are the most important. In
the top part of the table, we see that in the case of two institutions, with level benchmark,
column 4 and 6, produce lower prices relative to the one institution case. The result is
persistent among the three different index configurations. Furthermore, we see that in the
case of overlapping benchmarks, column 6, in fact, the correlation between assets within
the same index is very close to zero in the level benchmark, which is also counterfactual,
as Barberis et al. (2005) show in the asset class effect, there is a correlation among assets
within the same benchmark.
49
1I R-B 1I L-B IR R-B IR L-B CR R-B CR L-B
S1 1.07 1.04 1.07 1.02 1.07 1.01
S2 1.07 1.04 1.07 1.02 1.12 1.10
S3 1.02 0.99 1.07 1.02 1.07 1.01
S4 1.02 0.99 1.07 1.02 1.02 0.95
θ1 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.15
θ2 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.15 -0.06 -0.02
θ3 0.14 0.19 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.15
θ4 0.14 0.19 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.30
σ11 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
σ12 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0
σ13 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
σ14 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004
σ21 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0
σ22 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
σ23 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0
σ24 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0
σ31 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.02
σ32 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0
σ33 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
σ34 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004
σ41 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004
σ42 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0
σ43 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004
σ44 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Table 6.1: λ1 = λ2 = 0.5, time horizon is three years, β1 = β2 = T (0.6%), γ1 = γ2 = 2%,
taken from Cuoco and Kaniel (2011). χi for i = 1, 2, represents the assets included in
benchmark of institutions i. The abbreviations 1I, one institutional investor, corresponds
to χ1 = (0000) , χ2 = (0011), IR, two institutions with independent benchmarks, corre-
sponds to χ1 = (0011) , χ2 = (1100), CR, two institutions with overlapping benchmarks,
corresponds to χ1 = (0110) , χ2 = (0011). R-BM and L-BM corresponds to relative bench-
mark and level benchmark respectively.
Chapter 7
Asset Pricing Phenomena
In this chapter we show that institutions benchmarking concerns provide a plausible ex-
planation to three known empirical phenomena: Idiosyncratic pricing, the low volatility
puzzle and the asset class effect, described at length below. These empirical phenomena,
were mainly explained by behavioral asset pricing models, relying on irrational investment
behavior. As far as we know, this model is the only rational explanation addressing all
these phenomena at once. We conclude this chapter by providing an example on how a
policy maker can use the flexibility of the model to test for different implications.
7.1 Idiosyncratic Pricing
The effects of idiosyncratic shocks on prices was first explored by Campbell et al. (2001):
there are some idiosyncratic shocks that have more pronounced impact on prices than oth-
ers. The definition of idiosyncratic shock in this context as well as in our model is a shock
that reveals information on a single future cash flow. In our model different idiosyncratic
shocks have different prices. All shocks appear in the aggregate hedging component but
only a few appear in the index hedging component. It appears that shocks that are propa-
gated through the index hedging component have a profound effect on asset prices. Indeed,
even when dividends are significantly correlated the price difference between benchmarked
and non benchmarked assets is substantial. It is the idiosyncratic part of the dividend
stream that drives the difference.
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The economic intuition for this effect arises from the fact that institutions fail to diver-
sify in the usual sense, their portfolios are tilted towards their benchmarks, therefore they
are more exposed to shocks in these assets. This result is aligned with the empirical evi-
dence. Campbell et al. (2001) and Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) and Boyer et al. (2010),
claim that due to investors’ failure to diversify, idiosyncratic risk matters for pricing. If
cash flows are exposed to idiosyncratic shocks, idiosyncratic pricing provides a rational ex-
planation to the twin stock price discrepancy, documented by Rosenthal and Young (1990)
and Dabora and Froot (1999), and the parent and subsidiary stock discrepancy, docu-
mented by Mitchell et al. (2002) and Lamont and Thaler (2003). Our economic framework
provides a feasible explanation to the empirical evidence, as shown in Table 4.1. As long
as the institutions benchmark different assets asset prices diverge, even if their dividend
streams are highly correlated.
7.2 The Low Volatility Puzzle
Traditional asset pricing models imply that bearing more risk should be compensated by a
higher expected return. However, this result is counterfactual, as Baker et al. (2010) shows:
low volatility investments outperform high volatility investments, which entails that the
market price of risk of low volatility stocks is higher than the market price of risk of high
volatility stocks. Economically, institutions’ demand for benchmarked assets pushes their
market price of risk down and their volatilities up. This result was first discovered by Ang
et al. (2006) and Ang et al. (2009), where they show that stocks with high idiosyncratic
volatility have extremely low returns, contradicting what a traditional asset pricing the-
ory implies. However, institutional benchmarking can be responsible for this anomaly. In
equilibrium, institutions’ holdings are concentrated in the benchmark, implying that the
sensitivity of benchmarked assets to cash flow shocks within the index is higher than to
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cash flow shocks outside the index. In order to make the benchmarked asset less desirable
to hold, their market prices of risk are reduced, while their volatilities remain high. Aligned
with this intuition, in Figure 4.1 we observe that high volatility investments have higher
market prices of risk.
7.3 Asset Class Effect
The comovement of assets within the same class was explored by Vijh (1994) and Barberis
et al. (2005). In the traditional asset pricing theory, the comovement of prices is reflected
by the comovement of fundamental values with the aggregate dividend, index inclusion
shouldn’t affect assets’ comovement. The evidence however, suggests otherwise: stock in-
clusion leads to a shift in the correlation structure of returns. This model, as observed
in previous theoretical literature on institutions also shows that the presence of institu-
tions generates the asset class effect: the increase in the correlation of stocks within the
same benchmark index. Empirical evidence suggests that there are numerous patterns of
comovement in asset returns. There are strong common factors in the returns of value
stocks, stocks in the same industry, S&P500 stocks, small cap stocks and others, as was
reported in Barberis et al. (2005). Related to the asset class effect, is the stock inclusion
effect: a stock price increases with inclusion in- and decreases with exclusion out- of an
index. This phenomena was first explored by Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986).
Chen et al. (2004) show that the effect is more pronounced in recent years aligning with the
increased size of the institutional sector over these years, as was reported by Blume and
Keim (2012). This is in agreement with our model, predicting that institutions tilt their
portfolios towards the indexed stocks, effectively increasing their prices. Furthermore, the
magnitude of the change depends on the size of the institutional sector, as the empirical
findings suggest.
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7.4 Remarks
There are several guidelines that a policy maker can extract from this model. For exam-
ple, suppose that the question a policy maker tries to answer is whether funds managers
truthfully self report their benchmarks; it may be the case that institutions hide their true
benchmarks. The theoretical framework provides the hypothesis on how asset prices differ
between the different index configurations. He could then test the hypothesis in the data
by comparing the difference in asset prices while controlling for the heterogeneities. As
shown above, changing the index configuration has profound implications on asset prices.
If institutions’ benchmarks do overlap it should result in different asset pricing quantities.
In that sense, the model is very flexible, and can easily address economies with large op-
portunity sets and with multiple institutions. Furthermore, heterogeneity in the model’s
parameters can be introduced to accommodate the heterogeneities in the data, without
tempering the analytical expressions.
Chapter 8
Empirical Predictions
In this chapter we provide an empirical analysis of the model’s asset pricing implications.
More specifically, we draw the attention to an empirical prediction that we believe is im-
portant and was not reported in previous literature. What we coin, the flight to benchmark
property, suggests that institutions transfer more funds to their benchmarks when market
volatility is high. Due to market clearing, in such cases, the first institution takes a short
position on the other institution’s benchmark, by doing so, effectively creates a negative
correlation across their benchmarks. Having a short position on the other benchmark
implies that positive shocks to the dividend cash-flow of the other benchmark negatively
affect the first institution’s wealth, which therefore reduces its holdings in its benchmark
thereby decrease asset prices in its benchmark.
The relation between an increase in market volatility and systemic risk was explored
by Campbell and Hentschel (1992), where they show that around a market crash the mar-
ket volatility significantly increases. Furthermore, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)
and later also Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) investigate the relation between market
crashes and market volatility, among other things. This relation suggests that a substantial
increase in market volatility is an indicator of a possible market crash. In such episodes
assets’ co-movements increase. That is, when market volatility rises, correlations between
assets become more pronounced, as was observed in the financial crisis in 2008. Economi-
cally, when aggregate shocks are included in the economic framework, assets’ correlations
are positive. As they affect all assets the same way, there is no reason for institutions to
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change their asset allocation within the risky opportunity set. In traditional asset pricing
theory, the co-movement of assets is generated by the comovement of the fundamentals
with the pricing kernel. When there are no aggregate shocks this correlation is small.
However, as was shown in Chapter 7, institutional benchmarking generates co-movement
of assets even when there are only idiosyncratic fundamental shocks. Therefore, address-
ing co-movement of assets in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks is reasonable when the
market participants are institutions with benchmarking concerns.
The effects of idiosyncratic shocks on the co-movement of assets are hard to detect, and
therefore not reported in the empirical literature. Due to this shortcoming, no one really
investigated industries correlation when systemic risk, or aggregate shocks are excluded.
Our theoretical prediction suggests that institutions revert holdings to their benchmarked
assets when the market volatility is high, subsequently implying that correlation across
benchmarks becomes more negative. When the first institution increases its holdings in
its benchmark, it implies that the other institution, due to equilibrium market clearing,
takes the other side of the trade, and provides liquidity by taking a bigger short position
on the first benchmark. Because each institution is levered on its benchmark and takes a
short position on the other benchmark, a positive shock in the other benchmark, negatively
affects the wealth of the first institution, subsequently reducing its leverage, which reduces
the price levels of assets in the first benchmark.
In this empirical analysis we show that when aggregate shocks are excluded, the model’s
prediction is in fact correct. Aggregate shock exclusion is achieved by subtracting the cross-
industries mean, period by period. Afterwards, in episodes of high market volatility, the
correlation between different industries is negative, while in episodes of low market volatility
the effect is substantially mitigated or reversed. This empirical outcome strongly supports
the existence of benchmarking institutions and reinforces the theoretical framework.
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In Figure 8.1 we plot a one year rolling window of standard deviation time series for
four different industries between 1926 and 2014.1 As one can observe from the data, there
was an episode of high standard deviation around the 1930, what was afterwards coined the
‘great depression’. Afterwards there were few decades of low standard deviation episodes
until the year 2000, when the tech bubble burst.
As was expressed earlier, the flight to benchmark property implies that the correla-
tion across industries is negative when market volatility is high in cases even when only
idiosyncratic shocks are present. Therefore, in our empirical analysis, before we compute
the rolling window of correlation time series, we first de-mean the time series so that the
aggregate shocks are removed. This is achieved by subtracting the mean, across indus-
tries, period by period. By doing so, we remove common shocks, or aggregate shocks.
The idea behind is that aggregate shocks affect the cross section of industries in the same
way. When we sum over different industries the idiosyncratic component is “cancelled out”
and only the aggregate component appears. Therefore, subtracting the average of across
industries period by period mean, we remove the aggregate component from the time series.
We split the sample into two main periods, the tranquil period between 1960-1980
and the volatile period between 1995-2005. In Figure 8.2, the solid line represents the
correlation over the whole period, the dashed line represents the correlation over the specific
period and the time series in each window represents a one year rolling window of the
time series of correlation over that period. In the left panel, we illustrate the correlation
between Manufacturing and High-Tech industries. As we can see, in the tranquil time the
correlation is positive, while in the high volatility period the correlation becomes negative.
In the right panel we illustrate the correlation between Durable and non Durable industries.
Here, the effects are even more pronounced. During the tranquil times, the correlation is
slightly negative while in the high volatility period the correlation becomes substantially
1Data is taken from Kenneth French’s website, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 8.1: In these graphs we plot a one year rolling window of standard deviations
between 1926 and 2014. The industry level data was taken from Kenneth French’s website,
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
negative. The effect between these two industries is much stronger because an increase
in standard deviation should reduce the magnitude of the correlation, but here the shifts
in asset allocation of institutions are stronger and therefore, they undo the effects of the
standard deviation.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 8.2: In these graphs we plot a one year rolling window of correlations between two
different industries over two different time horizons, 1960-1980 at the top and 1995-2005
at the bottom, and on the left between Manufacturing and High-Tech and on the right
between Durable and non-Durable. The dashed line represents the correlation over the
aforementioned time period and the full line represents the correlation over the whole
period, 1926-2014. The industry level data was taken from Kenneth French website,
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
Chapter 9
Conclusions
In this thesis we have incorporated heterogeneous institutions into an asset pricing equi-
librium model by adding their different benchmarking concerns in preferences. We have
shown that a relative subsistence benchmark with constant relative risk aversion prefer-
ence has major implications on asset prices, within and across benchmarks. We show that
institutions’ tilt towards their benchmark is exacerbated on the independent part of their
benchmark and is financed by taking short positions on the other institutions’ benchmarked
assets. In addition, adding an asset to a wide benchmark while removing it from a narrow
benchmark causes prices and volatilities to decrease and market prices of risk to increase.
Furthermore, we show that institutions revert holdings to their benchmarks when the fun-
damental volatility is high, which creates a further demand pressure on the overlapping
part of the benchmark that causes prices to increase and market prices of risk to decrease.
Our model explains several empirical phenomena that were previously addressed by be-
havioral asset pricing models. The institutional demand for low market price of risk assets,
asset prices appreciation with inclusion, asset-class effect and the twin stocks discrepancy
are among the phenomena that we explain using institutional investors. Lastly, by endo-
genizing the benchmark choices, we find that the optimal index configuration is obtained
when all institutions benchmark the same fully diversified index.
In addition, we have shown that institutions further tilt their portfolios towards their
benchmarks as the cash flows become riskier, meaning institutions are even less diversified
as the cash flows become more volatile. This flight to benchmark behavior of institutions
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amplifies bad economic news and has the potential to explain systematic defaults and mar-
ket crashes. In addition, when institutions’ benchmarks overlap their behavior creates a
price pressure on the overlapping assets, resulting in a price appreciation. Moreover, we
have shown that the highest wealth effect is obtained when institutions benchmark the
same narrow index. Lastly, by endogenizing the benchmark choices, we have shown that
the optimal index configuration is obtained when all institutions benchmark the same fully
diversified index. In the empirical chapter we showed that there are new empirical predic-
tions that this model can produce can be tested on the empirical data.
Concluding, most of the results presented in this thesis are qualitative results. In our
analysis we aimed to keep the model as simple as possible by excluding heterogeneities
in primitives. The set of parameters in the illustrations are the same with only minor
deviations. So that, qualitatively, the empirical phenomena discussed in the thesis can be
addressed by the same set of parameters. However, the model is very flexible and can po-
tentially be calibrated to match empirical data. For example by introducing heterogeneity
in cash flow volatilities, reflecting empirical differences in asset classes. In addition, the
flight to benchmark behavior of institutions suggests that by modeling default, this behav-
ior can amplify the effects of high cash flow volatility. An increase in cash flow volatility
increases the chances of a market crash and, at the same time, institutions become less
diversified, which further increases the chances of a market crash. This amplification effect
may play a key role in explaining systematic disasters.
Appendix A
The Baseline Case
This section’s main purpose is to illustrate the changes between economies with no insti-
tutions, the baseline case, and economies with institutions. The equilibrium, asset prices
and portfolios are simply obtained by plugging IiT ≡ 1 in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. The
results for this case were first introduced by Lucas (1978), and have been presented in
many different settings in numerous papers. We outline it here to emphasis what features
of the model change with the introduction of institutions.
By plugging IiT ≡ 1, for i = 1, 2, ..,M in (3.8) we get that the optimal sharing rule of each
agent is constant and equals to its initial share. That is, PiT ≡ P¯ i = λi, investor i holds a
fixed λi share of the wealth.
Summary of Results for the Baseline Case:
The optimal sharing rule implies, W¯iT = P¯iDT , is characterized by P¯i =
λi∑M
i=1 λi
= λi.
market prices of risk are given by
θ¯t = R
Et
[
D−RT σ
D
T
]
Et
[
D−RT
] . (A.1)
Asset volatilities are given by
σ¯
Sj
jt = σej +REt
 D−RT
Et
[
D−RT
] − D−RT DjT
Et
[
D−RT DjT
]
σDT
 . (A.2)
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Optimal portfolios are given by
p¯i1t =
(
σ¯St
)−1θ¯t + (1−R)Et
 D−RT DT
Et
[
D−RT DT
]σDT
 , (A.3)
where the optimal wealth of agent i is given by W¯it = λi
Et[D1−RT ]
Et[D−RT ]
and the j’s asset price is
given by S¯jt =
Et[D−RT DjT ]
Et[D−RT ]
.
Appendix B
Geometric Benchmark
The index configuration was defined earlier in (3.6). In this special case we have
χij =

1
ni
if the j’th asset is included in the benchmark of the i’th institution
0 else
,
where the benchmark of investor i is a equally weighted geometric average of assets’ returns
characterized by
SIiT =
N∏
j=1
(SjT )
χij
IiT =
N∏
j=1
(DjT )
χij ,
with αij =
1
ni
Proposition 6 (Geometric Benchmark).
Market prices of risk are given by
θt = REt
[
MT
Et [MT ]
σDT
]
− (R− 1)σ
M∑
i=1
Et
[
MT
Et [MT ]
PiT
]
χi. (B.1)
Asset volatilities are given by
σSjt = σej +REt
[(
MT
Et [MT ]
− MTDjT
Et [MTDjT ]
)
σDT
]
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− (R− 1)σ
M∑
i=1
Et
[(
MT
Et [MT ]
− MTDjT
Et [MTDjT ]
)
PiT
]
χi. (B.2)
Optimal portfolios (wealth volatilities) are given by
σSt piit = θt +
R− 1
R
σχi (B.3)
− (R− 1)Et
 I1−
1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
Et
[
I
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
]σDT
+ (R− 1)2 σR
M∑
k=1
Et
 I1−
1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
Et
[
I
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
]P kT
χk.
The wealth and asset prices are given in Theorem 2.
Appendix C
Linear Benchmark
The index configuration was defined earlier in (3.6). In this special case we have
χij =
 1 if the j’th asset is included in the benchmark of the i’th institution0 else ,
where the benchmark of investor i is a weighted arithmetic average of assets’ returns
characterized by
SIiT =
N∑
j=1
χijSjT
IiT =
N∑
j=1
χijDjT
Proposition 7 (Linear Benchmark).
Market prices of risk are given by
θt = REt
[
MT
Et [MT ]
σDT
]
− (R− 1)σ
M∑
i=1
Et
[
MT
Et [MT ]
PiT
DiT
IiT
]
χi. (C.1)
Asset volatilities are given by
σSjt = σej +REt
[(
MT
Et [MT ]
− MTDjT
Et [MTDjT ]
)
σDT
]
− (R− 1)σ
M∑
i=1
Et
[(
MT
Et [MT ]
− MTDjT
Et [MTDjT ]
)
PiT
DiT
IiT
]
χi. (C.2)
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Optimal portfolios (wealth volatilities) are given by
σSt piit = θt +
R− 1
R
Et
 I1−
1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
Et
[
I
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
]DiT
IiT
σχi (C.3)
− (R− 1)Et
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R
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T
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[
I
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R
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1− 1
R
T
]σDT
+ (R− 1)2 σR
M∑
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R
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1− 1
R
T
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[
I
1− 1
R
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T
]P kT DkTIkT
χk.
The wealth and asset prices are given in Theorem 2.
Appendix D
Proofs
The following Lemma is a step in proving Theorem 1. It states sufficient conditions under
which the expected values in the main theorem are finite.
Lemma 1. Processes fT and gT with the evolution
dft
ft
= µft dt+ σ
f ′
t dωt, f0 ∈ (0,∞),
dgt
gt
= µgt dt+ σ
g′
t dωg, g0 ∈ (0,∞),
where T < ∞, µft , ‖σft ‖2 and µgt , ‖σgt ‖2 are bounded processes and away from zero, has a
finite expected value and so are their powers and multiplication.
Proof. The bounded drift implies that µft ≤ µ¯, from some constant µ¯, and the bounded
‖σft ‖2 implies that Novikov condition is satisfied. Therefore, we conclude that
E [fT ] = f0E
[
exp
{∫ T
0
(
µfs −
1
2
‖σfs ‖2
)
ds+
∫ T
0
σf ′s dωs
}]
≤ f0 exp {µ¯T}E
[
exp
{
−
∫ T
0
1
2
‖σfs ‖2ds+
∫ T
0
σf ′s dωs
}]
= f0 exp {µ¯T} <∞.
Showing that the power and multiplication are also finite is done by using Ito’s Lemma and
observing that the process is also an exponential form with bounded coefficients, thereby
has finite expected value.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Equilibrium) . We conjecture that markets are complete and
adopt the equivalent martingale method approach pioneered by Karatzas, Lehoczky, and
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Shreve (1987), Cox and Huang (1989) and Cox and Huang (1991).
The first order condition of investor i is given by
WiT = IiT (yiξT IiT )
− 1
R ≥ 0,
where yi is the Lagrange multiplier that can be obtained by plugging WiT into the static
budget constraint, E [ξTWiT ] = λiSm0,
y
− 1
R
i =
λiSm0
E
[
ξ
1− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
] > 0.
By plugging the Lagrange multiplier back into the first order condition we get that
ξTWiT = λiSm0
ξ
1− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
E
[
ξ
1− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
] . (D.1)
By Ito’s Lemma, we obtain that Dt is characterized by
dDt = d
N∑
j=1
Djt =
N∑
j=1
dDjt =
N∑
j=1
Djt (µdt+ σdωjt)
=
N∑
j=1
Djtµdt+
N∑
j=1
Djtσdωjt = Dtµdt+Dtσ
N∑
j=1
Djt
Dt
dωjt
= Dt
(
µdt+ σD′t dωt
)
(D.2)
The sharing rule is optimal if it satisfies the market clearing condition in the consumption
good and agents’ first order conditions. By plugging the conjectured optimal share, (3.8),
we get that
M∑
i=1
WiT = DT
M∑
i=1
PiT = DT ,
the sum of all shares equals one. In order to check that agents behave optimally need to
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make sure that
PiTDT = WiT , i = 1, 2, ..,M.
This is obtained by plugging the conjectured optimal shares to the corresponding first order
conditions,
ξTPiTDT = ξT
Ai (IiT )
1− 1
R∑M
n=1An (InT )
1− 1
R
DT ,
plugging the definition of Ai, dividing and multiplying by Sm0 and ξ
1− 1
R
T and rearranging
we get that
ξTPiTDT = ξT
λiSm0 (ξT IiT )1− 1R
E
[(
ξT I1T
)1− 1
R
]

 M∑
n=1
λnSm0
(ξT InT )
1− 1
R
E
[(
ξT InT
)1− 1
R
]

−1
DT .
By using (D.1) and recalling the market clearing condition in the consumption good we
get the desired result,
ξTPiTDT = ξT (ξTWiT )
1
ξT
∑M
n=1WnT
DT = ξTWiT
1
DT
DT = ξTWiT .
Now, to check that the agents behave optimally we plug the conjectured optimal sharing
rule in their first order conditions as follows
P 1TDT = λ1Sm0
ξ
− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
1T
E
[
ξ
1− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
1T
] ,
PiTDT = λiSm0
ξ
− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
E
[
ξ
1− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
] .
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Dividing these two equations yields
P 1T
PiT
=
I
1− 1
R
1T
AiI
1− 1
R
iT
.
Rearranging the equation and summing over the investors, i = 2, ..,M we get
P 1T
M∑
i=2
AiI
1− 1
R
iT = I
1− 1
R
1T
M∑
i=2
PiT = I
1− 1
R
1T
(
1− P 1T
)
.
Which leads to P 1T as we see in Equation 3.8, with i = 1. Repeating the same argument
with general type k gives
P kT
PiT
=
P kT
P 1T
P 1T
PiT
=
AkI
1− 1
R
kT
I
1− 1
R
1T
I
1− 1
R
1T
AiI
1− 1
R
iT
=
AkI
1− 1
R
kT
AiI
1− 1
R
iT
.
Rearranging the equation and summing over all the agents, with i 6= k we get
P kT
M∑
i=1, 6=k
AiI
1− 1
R
iT = AkI
1− 1
R
kT
M∑
i=1,6=k
PiT = AkI
1− 1
R
kT
(
1− P kT
)
.
Which leads to P kT as we see in Equation 3.8, for a general k.
Once we have shown that PiT is the optimal sharing rule, finding ξT is done by plugging
the optimal share to investor i first order condition,
PiTDT = λiSm0
ξ
− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
E
[
ξ
1− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
] ,
dividing and multiplying by Ai and rearranging we get that
ξT =
E
[
(ξT IiT )
1− 1
R
]
Ai
λiSm0
DTPiT
AiI
1− 1
R
iT
−R =
E
[
(ξT IiT )
1− 1
R
]
Ai
λiSm0
−RMT (D.3)
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and plugging the definition of Ai from (3.10) we finally get that
ξT =
E
[
(ξT I1T )
1− 1
R
]
λ1Sm0
−RMT . (D.4)
Both quantities are proportional with proportionality factor known at the onset. By taking
conditional expectation at time t, when t ∈ [0, T ], and using the fact that the state price
density is a martingale lead to the desired result.
In order to get the fixed point equation for Ai we use the result for ξT from (D.3) and write
E
[
(ξT IiT )
1− 1
R
]
= E

E
[
(ξT IiT )
1− 1
R
]
Ai
λiSm0
1−R (MT IiT )1− 1R
 ,
by rearranging this equation we get that
E
[
(ξT IiT )
1− 1
R
]R
= E
[(
Ai
λiSm0
)1−R
(MT IiT )
1− 1
R
]
and by dividing the equation of the first investor by the equation of the i’th investor we
get the fixed point equation for Ai,
Ai =
λi
λ1
E
[
(M1T I1T )
1− 1
R
]
E
[
(MT IiT )
1− 1
R
] . (D.5)
In order to derive the uniqueness of the solution, let us define an investor specific map
Ti (A0) : R+ → R+,
Ti (A0) ≡ λi
λ1
E
[
D1−RT
(∑M
n=1,6=iAnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
)R−1
(I1T )
1− 1
R
]
E
[
D1−RT
(∑M
n=1,6=iAnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
)R−1
(IiT )
1− 1
R
] , i = 1, 2, ...,M.
(D.6)
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Let Ah = A0 + , for  > 0. By looking at the difference we get that
Ti (Ah)− Ti (A0) ≤
λi
λ1
E
[
D1−RT (I1T )
1− 1
R
{(∑M
n=1,6=i AnI
1− 1
R
nT +AhI
1− 1
R
iT
)R−1
−
(∑M
n=1,6=i AnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
)R−1}]
E
[
D1−RT
(∑M
n=1, 6=i AnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
)R−1
(IiT )
1− 1
R
] ,
by defining
Gi () ≡
 M∑
n=1, 6=i
AnI
1− 1
R
nT +AhI
1− 1
R
iT
R−1 −
 M∑
n=1,6=i
AnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
R−1 ,
noticing that Gi () is twice differentiable function and deriving its Taylor expansion around
zero we get that
Gi () = 0+ (R− 1)
 M∑
n=1, 6=i
AnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
R−2 I1− 1RiT 
+
(R− 1) (R− 2)
2
 M∑
n=1, 6=i
AnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
R−3(I1− 1RiT )2 2 +O (2) .
We conclude that
Gi () ≤(R− 1) (R− 2)
2
 M∑
n=1, 6=i
AnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
R−3(I1− 1RiT )2 2 +O (2) ,
because R > 1 implies that the first element of Gi () is greater than zero. By plugging
this back into the main inequality we get that
Ti (Ah)− Ti (A0) ≤
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λi
λ1
E
[
D1−RT (I1T )
1− 1
R
(R−1)(R−2)
2
(∑M
n=1,6=iAnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
)R−3(
I
1− 1
R
iT
)2
2 +O (2)]
E
[
D1−RT
(∑M
n=1,6=iAnI
1− 1
R
nT +A0I
1− 1
R
iT
)R−1
(IiT )
1− 1
R
]
and by dividing both sides of the equation by  and noticing that lim→0
O(2)
 = 0 we
conclude that
lim
→0
Ti (Ah)− Ti (A0)

≤ lim
→0
{
q1+ q2
O (2)

}
= 0.
q1 and q2 are finite as is shown below.
In addition, if we set A0 = 0 we get that
Ti (0) =
λi
λ1
E
[
D1−RT
(∑M
n=1,6=iAnI
1− 1
R
nT
)R−1
(I1T )
1− 1
R
]
E
[
D1−RT
(∑M
n=1, 6=iAnI
1− 1
R
nT
)R−1
(IiT )
1− 1
R
] > 0.
Because we have established that for any A0 the derivative of Ti(0) equals 0 as well as
Ti(0) > 0, Ti(A0) has a unique fixed point. Let us set the fixed point to be Ai and
conclude that
Ai = Ti(Ai) ≡ λi
λ1
E
[
(MT I1T )
1− 1
R
]
E
[
(MT IiT )
1− 1
R
] .
Showing that the expected values are finite we use Ito’s Lemma on Mt and get that
dMt
Mt
= −R (µDt dt+ σD′t dωt)+R M∑
i=1
Pit
(
µ
IRi
t dt+ σ
IRi ′
t dωt
)
+
1
2
R (1 +R) ‖σDt ‖2 − 2R2 M∑
i=1
Pitσ
D′
t · σI
R
i
t +R (R− 1)
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
PitPjtσ
IRi ′
t · σ
IRj
t
 dt
≡ µMt dt+ σM ′t dωt, (D.7)
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where µ
IRi
t and σ
IRi
t are the drift and volatility of I
1− 1
R
it characterized by
µ
IRi
t ≡
(
1− 1
R
)(
µIit −
1
R
‖σIit ‖2
)
,
σ
IRi
t ≡
(
1− 1
R
)
σIit .
Note that both µMt , ‖σMt ‖ and µIit , ‖σIit ‖ are bounded, implying that so are the drift and
the norm of the volatility of M
1− 1
R
t I
1− 1
R
it . The expected values in q1 and q2 can also be
written as multiplications and powers of MT , IiT and DT , which implies that they are
finite as well.
By Lemma 1 we conclude that for a fixed set of adjustment weights the expected values in
(3.10) are finite.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Equivalence). The proof is done in two steps. In the first
step, we show that the pricing kernels are identical. If every institution i ∈ Iˆ have the
same benchmark index then the risk adjustment costs of every institution i ∈ Iˆ are the
same as well, implying that
∑
i∈Iˆ
Ai =
∑
i∈Iˆ
λi
λ1
E
[
(MT I1T )
1− 1
R
]
E
[
(MT IiT )
1− 1
R
] = (∑i∈Iˆ λi
λ1
) E [(MT I1T )1− 1R ]
E
[
(MT IiT )
1− 1
R
] ≡ A¯i.
If we plug this to the pricing kernel we get that
MM1T = D
−R
T
A1I1− 1R1T + ...+∑
i∈Iˆ
AiI
1− 1
R
iT + ...+AMI
1− 1
R
MT
R
= D−RT
(
A1I
1− 1
R
1T + ...+ A¯iI
1− 1
R
iT + ...+AMI
1− 1
R
MT
)R
= MM2T ,
where M1 denotes the original economy and M2 the new one. In the second step, we
outline that if both economies have identical cash flows and identical pricing kernels then
stock prices, stock volatilities and market prices of risk are the same. Moreover, because
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the optimal share, PiT , is the same for the rest of the market participants, their portfolio
holdings does not change as well.
Proof of Thereom 2 (Asset Prices and Portfolio Allocations). Optimal portfolios
and assets’ volatilities are obtained by using Malliavin Derivatives and applications of the
Clark-Ocone Formula, Ocone (1988). Applications to finance were previously explored by
Ocone and Karatzas (1991), Detemple and Zapatero (1991) and Detemple, Garcia, and
Rindisbacher (2003).
Optimal wealth is obtained by using the no arbitrage argument, ξtWit = Et [ξTWiT ], by
plugging the optimal share and the state price density, (D.4), we get that
Wit =
Et [MTPiTDT ]
Et [MT ]
. (D.8)
Stocks prices are obtained the same way, by using the no arbitrage argument and using
the state price density, (D.4), we get that
Sjt = Et[ξt,TDjT ] =
Et [MTDjT ]
Et [MT ]
. (D.9)
Market prices of risk are obtained by taking the Malliavin Derivative of the state price
density, (D.4), doing so lead to
−θt = Et [DtMT ]
Et [MT ]
. (D.10)
The next step is obtained be unfolding MT according to (3.9),
−θt = −R
Et
[
MT
(
Dt logDT −Dt log
∑M
i=1AiI
1− 1
R
iT
)]
Et [MT ]
. (D.11)
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The Malliavin derivative of the index is characterized by
Dt log
M∑
i=1
AiI
1− 1
R
iT =
(
1− 1
R
) M∑
i=1
AiI
1− 1
R
iT∑M
i=1AiI
1− 1
R
iT
HIit,T
IiT
χi =
(
1− 1
R
) M∑
i=1
PiT
HIit,T
IiT
χi
(D.12)
Dt log I
1− 1
R
iT =
(
1− 1
R
)
HIit,T
IiT
χi (D.13)
where,
HIit,Tχi =
∫ T
t
(
Dtµ
Ii
t −
(
Dtσ
Ii
t
)′
σIit
)
ds+
∫ T
t
(
Dtσ
Ii
t
)′
dωs (D.14)
and because the exogenous dividend processes have constant volatilities we get that
Dt logDT = σ
D
T .
By plugging these results to (D.11) we get the desired result.
Stocks’ volatilities are obtained by taking the Malliavin derivative of the stock price, in
(D.9),
Sjtσ
S
jtEt [MT ] + SjtEt [DtMT ] = Et [DtMTDjT ] + Et [MTDtDjT ] ,
using the result for θt from (D.10), the result for the stock price, Sjt, from (D.9) and
rearranging we get that
σSjt = θt +
Et [DtMTDjT ]
Et [MTDjT ]
+
Et [MTDtDjT ]
Et [MTDjT ]
.
The next step is obtained by plugging the Malliavin derivative of MT , (D.11), and of DjT ,
which equals to
Dt logDjT = σej ,
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into the above equation and get that
σSjt = σej + θt −R
Et
[
MTDjTσ
D
T
]
Et [MTDjT ]
+ (R− 1)
M∑
i=1
Et
[
MTDjTPiT
H
Ii
t,T
IiT
]
Et [MTDjT ]
χi.
By plugging θt from (C.1) we get the desired result. Following Karatzas et al. (1987) we
show that
σSjt ≥ σej −REt
[
MTDjT
Et [MTDjT ]
σDT
]
− (R− 1)
M∑
i=1
Et
[
MT
Et [MT ]
PiT
HIit,T
IiT
]
χi
≥ σej −Rσ1− (R− 1)κ
M∑
i=1
χi
≥ σej −Rσ1− (R− 1)κM1 = σej −K1,
where κ is finite because 1IiT and H
Ii
t,T have finite drifts and norms of volatilities and
PiT ≤ 1. Therefore, by Lemma 1 have finite expected value. We conclude that the
stock volatility matrix is non degenerate and can be inverted; the conjectured market
completeness assumption is fully justified. Before we derive the optimal portfolios we
rewrite the wealth of agent i, (D.8), as
WitEt [MT ] = Et
AiI1− 1RiT
 DT∑M
i=1AiI
1− 1
R
iT
1−R
 = AiEt [I1− 1RiT M1− 1RT ] . (D.15)
By taking the Malliavin derivative of this equation we get that
σSt piitWitEt [MT ] +WitEt [DtMT ] = AiEt
[
DtI
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
]
+AiEt
[
I
1− 1
R
iT DtM
1− 1
R
T
]
.
Moreover, we already established DtI
1− 1
R
iT in (D.13) and that
DtM
1− 1
R
T =
(
1− 1R
)
M
1− 1
R
T Dt logMT =
(
1− 1R
)
M
1− 1
R
T
(
−RσDt + (R− 1)
∑M
i=1 PiT
H
Ii
t,T
IiT
χi
)
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= M
1− 1
R
T
(
(1−R)σDT +
(R− 1)2
R
M∑
i=1
PiT
HIit,T
IiT
χi
)
.
By plugging these Malliavin derivatives and using the result for Wit from (D.22) we get
that
σSt piitWitEt [MT ] +WitEt [DtMT ] =
(
1− 1
R
)
WitEt
[
I
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T
HIit,T
IiT
]
χi
+ (1−R)AiEt
[
I
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T σ
D
T
]
+
(1−R)2
R
Ai
M∑
j=1
Et
[
I
1− 1
R
iT M
1− 1
R
T PjT
H
Ij
t,T
IjT
]
χi.
Lastly, by plugging Wit, (D.22), and using the result for θt, (D.10), we get the desired
result.
Specifying the result for a geometric index is obtained by observing that
HIit,Tχi = σIiTχi
and for a linear index by observing that
HIit,Tχi = σDiTχi
Lemma 2. For any investor i and for any time t ∈ [0, T ] there is a one to one map between
stocks and their corresponding dividend news processes, such that
Sjt ∈ SIit ⇐⇒ Djt ∈ Iit, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., N}, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose by contradiction that there exist a time t ∈ [0, T ] and
investor i such that Sjt /∈ SIit but Djt ∈ Iit. Due to the fixed composition of SIit and Iit
we get that at the terminal time, T , SjT /∈ SIiT but DjT ∈ IiT , which contradicts the no
arbitrage condition stating that SIiT = IiT . The same argument follows if there exist a
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Djt /∈ Iit but Sjt ∈ SIit .
The notion of indistinguishability is key to understanding the following results. We say
that X and Y are two indistinguishable processes if they have the same sample paths
probability almost surely. More technically, there exist an event A, with probability one,
such that
Xt (ω) = Yt (ω) , ∀ω ∈ A, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof of Proposition 2 (Asset Prices Effects). Let us start with the market price
of risk. By looking at the difference between the market prices of risk, θ′tel and θ′tek, and
plugging the definition of σDT from (3.2) we get that
θtk − θtl = RσEt
[
MT
Et [MT ]
(
DkT
DT
− DlT
DT
)]
− (R− 1)σ
nk−ni∑
i=1
Et
[
MT
Et [MT ]
PiT
]
1
ni
(D.16)
and by comparing the variables state by state we get that
0 = Rσ
(
DkT
DT
− DlT
DT
)
< (R− 1)σ
nk−ni∑
i=1
PiT
1
ni
.
The inequality holds because PiT > 0, R > 1 and
DkT
DT
is indistinguishable from DlTDT .
Therefore, if we multiply by MT and take conditional expectations we get that θtk ≤ θtl.
By using the evolution of Mt, (D.7), and the evolution of Djt, (3.1), we get that
d (MtDjt)
MtDjt
=
(
µMt + µ+ σσ
M ′
t ej
)
dt+
(
σM ′t + σe
′
j
)
dωt, (D.17)
where j = k, l.
First we observe that by assumption MtDlt = MtDkt, the volatility components are indis-
tinguishable,
σM ′t dωt + σdωlt = σ
M ′
t dωt + σdωkt
and the first two components of the drifts are identical for j = l, k. Second, by unfolding
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the last component of the drift according to (D.7) we get that
σσM ′t ek = σ
2
(
−RDkt
Dt
+ (R− 1)
nk∑
i=1
Pit
)
> σ2
(
−RDlt
Dt
+ (R− 1)
nl∑
i=1
Pit
)
= σσM ′t el,
(D.18)
because DktDt and
Dlt
Dt
are indistinguishable, nl ≤ nk, which translates into
∑ni
i=1 Pit ≤∑nk
i=1 Pit, and R > 1. Therefore, we conclude that
MTDkT ≥MTDlT
and by taking expectation we get the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Symmetry). Identical benchmark sizes implies that I1T is in-
distinguishable from I2T , which further implies that A1 = A2. Suppose by contradiction
and without loss of generality that A1 > A2. In this case,
E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R1T +A2I1− 1R2T )R I1T
)1− 1
R
 > E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R1T +A2I1− 1R2T )R I2T
)1− 1
R

By the indistinguishability we can replace I1T and I2T . By doing this exercise on the left
and right hand sides we get
E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R2T +A2I1− 1R1T )R I2T
)1− 1
R
 > E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R2T +A2I1− 1R1T )R I1T
)1− 1
R

By analogy if the institutions switch indices we then have A1 < A2 which translates into
E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R2T +A2I1− 1R1T )R I2T
)1− 1
R
 < E
(D−RT (A1I1− 1R2T +A2I1− 1R1T )R I1T
)1− 1
R
 ,
which is a contradiction. The same exercise is done for assuming A1 < A2. Therefore we
81
can conclude that A1 = A2. Showing that the equilibrium quantities are equivalent is done
by observing that the relevant quantities are indistinguishable:
MTDjT = MTDiT ,
MT
DjT
DT
= MT
DiT
DT
,
MTP1T = MTP2T ,
MTDjT
DjT
DT
= MTDiT
DiT
DT
,
MTDjTP1T = MTDiTP1T ,
MTDjTP2T = MTDiTP2T ,
where j and i correspond to type10 and type01 assets respectively.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Optimal Index Configuration). The first order condition
for institution i, (D.1), is
WiT
IiT
= λiSm0
ξ
− 1
R
T I
− 1
R
iT
E
[
ξ
1− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
] ,
plugging this result to the utility function, (3.4), leads to
v0(IiT ) =
(λiSm0)
1−R
1−R
(
E
[
ξ
1− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
])R
.
By Theorem 1 we know that
ξT =
MT
E[MT ]
.
By plugging this to the value function we get
v0(IiT ) =
(λiSm0E[MT ])
1−R
1−R
(
E
[
M
1− 1
R
T I
1− 1
R
iT
])R
.
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By setting
κ =
(λiSm0E[MT ])
1−R
1−R
we get the value function in (5.1). We solve for the optimal benchmark by first postulate
an index configuration and, derive MˆT and κˆ. Second, we plug these values into the value
function and find the maximal index for each institution by iteration over possible values.
If the maximal index configuration is then equal to the postulated index configuration,
then the postulated index configuration is optimal.
Proof of Theorem 3(Equilibrium). Along the lines of Theorem 1 proof, markets are
complete, there exist a unique state price density and the static formulation applies.
The first order condition of investor i is given by
(βi + γi)
(
βiWiT + γi
(
WiT − SIiT
))−R
= yiξT (D.19)
Where yi is the Lagrange multiplier. Let y¯i =
yi
β+γ , rearranging leads to
WiT =
(y¯iξT )
− 1
R + γiS
Ii
T
βi + γi
.
This quantity satisfies WiT ≥ 0, so long as yi > 0.
The Lagrange multiplier is obtained by plugging WiT into the static budget constraint,
E [ξTWiT ] = λiSm0,
y¯
− 1
R
i =
λi (βi + γi)Sm0 − γiSIi0
E
[
ξ
1− 1
R
T
] (D.20)
For yi to be greater than 0 we require that
λi (βi + γi)
γi
>
E [ξT IiT ]
E [ξTDT ]
=
E [MT IiT ]
E [MTDT ]
,
whereby, the no arbitrage condition implies that SIi0 = E [ξT IiT ] and Sm0 = E [ξTDT ].
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For the sharing rule to be optimal it must satisfy the market clearing condition in the
consumption good and agents’ first order conditions. By plugging PiT from Equation 6.3,
using the expressions in 6.5 and 6.6 and showing that the sum over i,
∑M
i=1 PiT = 1, we
obtain that
M∑
i=1
WiT = DT
M∑
i=1
PiT = DT .
Now, checking that the agents behave optimally is done by plugging showing that
PiTDT = WiT , i = 1, 2, ..,M.
This is obtained by plugging the conjectured optimal sharing rule in their first order con-
ditions and show that first order derive the following relationship
(y¯1)
1
R
{
(β1 + γ1)P
1
TDT − γ1SI1T
}
= (y¯i)
1
R
{
(βi + γi)PiTDT − γiSIiT
}
.
Rearranging the equation leads to
PiT − γi (y¯i)
1
R
(βi + γi) (y¯i)
1
R
SIiT
DT
=
(β1 + γ1) (y¯1)
1
R
(βi + γi) (y¯i)
1
R
P 1T −
γ1 (y¯1)
1
R
(βi + γi) (y¯i)
1
R
SI1T
DT
.
Summing over the investors, i = 1, ..,M we get
1−
M∑
i=1
γi (y¯i)
1
R
(βi + γi) (y¯i)
1
R
SIiT
DT
= P 1T
M∑
i=1
(β1 + γ1) (y¯1)
1
R
(βi + γi) (y¯i)
1
R
−
M∑
i=1
γ1 (y¯1)
1
R
(βi + γi) (y¯i)
1
R
SI1T
DT
,
replacing the first investor by any j investor, plugging the definition of Aj,i and Ki, using
the no arbitrage condition at time T , SIiT = IiT for any investor i and noticing that Ai,i = 1
leading to the desired result.
Once we have shown that PiT is the optimal sharing rule, finding ξT is done by plugging
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the optimal share in the investor first order condition. For any investor i we get
(βi + γi) (y¯i)
1
R
{
PiT − γi
βi + γi
IiT
DT
}
DT = ξ
− 1
R
T ,
plugging the optimal sharing rule, (6.3), crossing similar elements and rearranging yields
ξT =
 (βi + γi) (y¯i) 1R∑M
j=1
(βi+γi)
(βj+γj)
Aj,i
−R1−
M∑
j=1
γj
(βj + γj)
IjT
DT

−R
D−RT ∝MT
As we can see there is a proportionality factor, known at the onset, between the state
price density and the pricing kernel as we defined it in Equation 6.4. Taking expectations
conditional on time t for t ∈ [0, T ] on both sides and using the fact that the state price
density is a martingale will lead to the desired result.
Proof of the Proposition 5. optimal wealth and stocks prices are obtained the same
way as in Proposition 2. Market price of risk can be obtained by taking Malliavin
Derivative of the state price density, in Equation 6.4, doing so will lead to
−θt = Et [DtMT ]
Et [MT ]
. (D.21)
The next step would be to unfold MT according to Equation 6.4,
−θt = −R
Et
[
M
1+ 1
R
T
(
DtDT −
∑M
j=1
γj
(βj+γj)
DtIjT
)]
Et [MT ]
,
because the exogenous dividend processes have constant volatilities we have
DtDT = σ
D
T DT ,
DtIiT = σ
Ii
T IiT .
85
Plugging these results and rearranging will lead to the desired result.
Stocks’ volatilities can be obtained by taking the Malliavin derivative of the asset price,
Sjtσ
S
jtEt [MT ] + SjtEt [DtMT ] = Et [DtMTDjT ] + Et [MTDtDjT ] ,
using the result for θt, (D.21), the result for the stock price Sjt and rearranging we get
σSjt = θt +
Et [DtMTDjT ]
Et [MTDjT ]
+
Et [MTDtDjT ]
Et [MTDjT ]
.
The next step would be to plug the Malliavin derivative of MT as we saw above, and the
Malliavin derivative of DjT , which equals to
Dt logDjT = σej ,
leading to,
σSjt = σej+θt −REt
 M1+ 1RT DjT
Et [MTDjT ]
(
σDT DT −
M∑
k=1
γk
(βk + γk)
σIkT IkT
) .
Plugging the θt from Equation 6.8 will lead to the desired result.
Before we derive the optimal portfolios we observe that the optimal sharing rule of agent
i, (6.3), can be rewritten as
P iTDT = Ki
(
M
− 1
R
T +
M∑
n=1
γi
(βn + γn)
Ai,nIiT
)
,
then Wit can be written as
WitEt [MT ] = KiEt
[(
M
1− 1
R
T +
M∑
n=1
γi
(βn + γn)
Ai,nIiTMT
)]
. (D.22)
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Taking the Malliavin derivative of this equation yields
σSt piitWitEt [MT ] +WitEt [DtMT ] =
KiEt
[
DtM
1− 1
R
T +
M∑
n=1
γi
(βn + γn)
Ai,n (DtIiTMT + IiTDtMT )
]
.
Using the result for DtMT , D.21 ,we have
σSt piitWitEt [MT ] +WitEt [DtMT ] = KiEt
[
(1−R)MT
(
σDT DT −
∑M
n=1
γn
(βn+γn)
σInT InT
)]
+Ki
M∑
n=1
γi
(βn + γn)
Ai,nEt
[
IiTMT
(
σIiT −RM
1
R
T
(
σDT DT −
M∑
n=1
γn
(βn + γn)
σInT InT
))]
.
Plugging θ, (6.8), and rearranging leads to the desired result.
σSt φit = Witθt
+KiEt
[
MT
Et[MT ]
(
σDT DT −
∑M
n=1
γn
(βn+γn)
σInT InT
)(
1−R
(
1 +
∑M
n=1
γi
(βn+γn)
Ai,nIiTM
1
R
T
))]
+Ki
M∑
n=1
γi
(βn + γn)
Ai,nEt
[
MT
Et [MT ]
IiTσ
Ii
T
]
, (D.23)
where φt ≡Witpit.
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